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PERSONAL STAKE, RULE 23, AND THE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTION'
STEVEN L. WELLBORN *
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' a class action
without a class representative is like one hand clapping. The concept simply is
t Copyright © 1980 by Boston College Law School.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. B.A., Northland
College, 1974; M.S., J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1976. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research assistance provided by the Winthrop and Frances Lane Foundation of Omaha.
FED. R. Clv. P. 23 [hereinafter cited as Rule 23] governs class actions in the federal
courts. It provides as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there arc questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to pro-
tect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the question of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
1
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not contemplated by the Rule. 2
 This creates a dilemma if the personal claim of
the named plaintiff, the putative class representative, becomes moot during the
pendency of a class action. The named plaintiff's ability to proceed with the
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; notice;
judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may he altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the cir-
cumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advice each member that (A) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request ex-
clusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires,
enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided
in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then he construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in conduct of actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of pro-
ceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in
the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or'otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requir-
ing:that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to
representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) deal-
ing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
(e) - •Dismissal or comprotinik. A elaSs action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the . prOposed dismissal or
compromise 'shall be given to'all'inembrs6f the'class in such manner as the court
dir cts, •
FED. R. CW. P. 23.
	
•	 •
2 The requirement of ajclass representative is inherent in'the'language Of.Rtik 23. Thus,'
for example; a class action can be•ce;iriMencedWh-eh `![n]ilep"e'more members of 4clas 	 spe
• as• repien taiiiie parties• on behalf	 '.!'•KideeP(a) (eMphasis added). Rule 23, and in- .
deed the Fgae:iil Rules in . theii:entirety, simPly,0 not prOvide kr . a.ii-ac:tion . by a class, as such in
r i .the 'abseneez OTLitisreSertia.4ye:	 = • •	 -	 1.	 •-e't , • •
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lawsuit is undermined for two reasons. First, unless an exception is made to the
requirements of Rule 23, the named plaintiff is no longer a potential class
representative.' Consequently, the named plaintiff can neither proceed on his
persona! claim (because it is moot), nor can he proceed on his class claims
(because he is not an appropriate class representative). Second, the named
plaintiff may no longer have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.
Thus, since personal stake is a prerequisite to any judicial action, 4 the named
plaintiff cannot continue with the suit. Nevertheless, unnamed class members
may have claims against the defendant that will remain unredressed if the ac-
tion cannot be prosecuted. 5 Hence, the unnamed class members have an in-
terest in the continuation of the lawsuit. This paradigmatic situation — the
mooted class action' — is the subject of this article.'
The developing doctrinal landscape on the personal stake issue is "one of
uncertain and shifting contours" ; 8 yet the Court has provided only amorphous
landmarks as guides through the unfamiliar terrain. While it is clear that there
are two components to the personal stake limitation on judicial power — a con-
stitutional limitation 9 and an additional, self-imposed restraintI° — it is unclear
3 The named plaintiff is disqualified as a class representative for two reasons: (1) he is no
longer a member of the class he seeks to represent, East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977); see text and notes at notes 183-84 infra; and (2) since he no
longer has a claim against the defendant, his claims arc no longer typical of the claims of the un-
named class members. See Rule 23(a)(3).
Although it is clear that there is a personal stake requirement, see United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1208 (1980); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 755 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), the law in this area is so muddled that
even the labels used to define the problem seem deficient in precision. For the purposes of this ar-
ticle, "personal stake" is employed as a generic term to describe both mootncss and standing
problems. Standing problems occur when the named plaintiff has little or no personal stake in the
lawsuit at the commencement of the action. Mootness problems occur when the named plaintiff
loses his personal stake in the lawsuit at some time during the pendency of the action. See also
note 21 infra.
5 See, e.g. , text at note 109 infra.
6 The term "mooted class action" is intended as a shorthand way to refer to class ac-
tions in which the named plaintiff's claim is lost or mooted, while unnamed class members retain
arguably valid claims. The term does not refer to a class action in which the claims of all class
members are moot, althuugh, admittedly:that is the situation it seems to describe. In this latter
situation, the action would bedismissed in its'entirety. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
As will be demonstrated, the mootecrclass action confirms the observation of one com-
mentator that Rule 23 ."tends ti.) ask more questions than it answers." Frankel, Some Preliminary
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F. R. D. 39,(1967). •
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 . (19.68), quoted in United States Parole Comm n v.
Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1211 (1980). Sue also text at notes 127-31 infra.
' 9 . The constitutional limitation of tht.i. 'persdnal stake doctrine is based on the "case or
controversy" language of article III. Although the precise parameters of the constitutional limita-
tion are unclear, this limitation has traditionally required some actual or threatened injury to the
plairitiff . aS'a result of the sillcgedly illegal eondUcfcifthe defendant. See, g. , United States Parole
COMM'n v. Geraghty, 100.S..Ct..1202' 1215t16 (Powell, dissenting); Gladstone„.Realtors.v.
Al; 99 (197,9)'See alip'if0t . andnOtes"at . otes .1321 .39 infra.
- •	 .'. 10 •1"fie self-imAsed 'kstr'dint of :the fiersorial•st4ke dactrine i4ierhaps even more amor-
 .
ph'4;t1j than the' constitutional 	 The,. self-iipposleilre'straint ti. an.exercise of judicial self
sigMficance.[wherel:
• iith6' goi7e'in'ine.ittar 	 tiihry cdruptbent • w 'ad&ess the questions 	 IMicre] 7:
.
judkiariA-terventn- rnay:1)8'"titirtecttss.acyttOivotaCt , trdividulil' rights. ' Warth v.	 .422 .
.	 •
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how the components are applied even to an individual plaintiff." When the
personal stake issue arises in class actions, and compliance with Rule 23 is
added as an issue, the doctrinal terrain begins to resemble Mount St. Helens.
This article will first examine the Supreme Court's failure to articulate an
acceptable doctrine for effectively dealing with the personal stake and Rule 23
issues that arise in mooted class actions. The Court's attitude toward.continu-
ance of class actions following post-certification and post-denial of certification
rnootness" will be presented, with particular emphasis on two recent decisions,
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper" and United Stales Parole Commission v.
Geraghty." Attention will then focus on the inequity existing between the
U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1215
(1980) (Powell, J. , dissenting); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-14 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion).
" See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, (1968); United States a rel. Chapman v. ITC,
345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
" For definitions of the terms post-certification mootness, post-denial of certification
mootness, pre-suit mootness and pre-certification mootness, see text and notes at notes 18-21 in-
fra.
13 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980).
" 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980). Roper and Geraghty were cases in which the named plaintiffs'
personal claims became moot after the court had denied class certification. See text and notes at
notes 58-78 infra. Prior to Roper and Geraghty, the courts of appeals had disagreed on an ap-
propriate resolution of such cases. Compare Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 46, 48-50 (5th
Cir. 1979) (named plaintiff cannot represent a class where class certification is incorrectly denied
and the named plaintiff's personal claim is subsequently dismissed) and Winokur v. Bell Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 560 F.2d 271, 275-77 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)
(named plaintiff cannot obtain appellate review of lower court's denial of class certification
where, subsequent to denial, named plaintiff's personal claim becomes moot), with Goodman v.
Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1331-33 (4th Cir. 1978) (named plaintiffs obtain appellate review of
tower court's denial of class certification even though, subsequent to denial, named plaintiffs'
personal claims were properly dismissed). See also Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 590 F.2d 140,
142-44 (5th Cir. 1979) (named plaintiff cannot obtain appellate review of class action issues
where class certification is denied and the named plaintiff's personal claims are subsequently
dismissed); Roper v. Consurve, Inc,, 578 F.2d 1106, 1110.11 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Cl. 1166 (1980) (named plaintiffs can obtain ap-
pellate review of lower court's denial of class certification even thoUgh, subsequent to denial,
named plaintiff's personal claims are mooted); Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987,
992-98 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded in light of Roper and Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1334 (1980)
(named plaintiff cannot represent a class where class certification is denied and the named plain-
tiff's personal claim is dismissed); Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2c1 1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1977) (named
plaintiffs cannot prosecute an fiction where class certification is denied and the named plaintiffs'
personal claims are subsequently mooted). The courts of appeals had also been split on an ap-
propriate resolution where the named plaintiff's claim became moot after the lawsuit had been
filed, but prior to a decision on class certification. Compare Susman v. Lincoln American Corp,,
587 F.2d 866, 868-71 (7th Cir. 1978) (named plaintiffs can pursue class claims where their in-
dividual claims are mooted by the tender of their full monetary damages prior to consideration of
the class certification issue), and Cox v. Babcock and Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (4th Cir.
1972) (class action need not he dismissed where named plaintiff's individual claim is dismissed
prior to class certification), with Shipp v. Memphis Area Office, 581 F.2d 1167, 1172-73 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1788 (1979) (named plaintiff could not pursue class claims where his
individual claim was dismissed prior to class certification), and Bradley v. Housing Auth., 512
F.2d 626, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1975) (class action dismissed where named plaintiff's claim is mooted
prior to class certification). See also Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (9th Cir.
1977) (class action dismissed where named plaintiff's personal claim is mooted prior to class cer-
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Court's handling of such situations and its treatment of cases involving pre-suit
and pre-certification mootness. Next, in deference to Justice Douglas' dictum
that "[g]eneralizations about [personal stake] are largely worthless as such," 15
the article will discuss the often conflicting policies presented by mooted class
actions in a specific substantive area — employment discrimination. t6 It will be
submitted that the Supreme Court's resolution of mooted class action issues
does not sufficiently consider these conflicting policies. Finally, a proposal for
dealing with the mooted class action in the field of employment discrimination
will be presented. It will be suggested that an analysis that includes both a
more liberal interpretation of the personal stake requirement and a narrower
construction of Rule 23 will result in a more acceptable resolution of mooted
class action issues.
I. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has struggled with the class action mootness issue in a
series of cases culminating in Roper and Geraghty. Despite the Court's protesta-
tions to the contrary," these cases place significance on when the loss of the
named plaintiff's personal claim occurs. The loss can occur at four points in the
action: 18
 (1) after the court has certified a class pursuant to Rule 23(c) ("post-
tification); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F.2d 1334, 1336-38 (9th Cir. 1977) (class
action dismissed where named plaintiff's personal claim is mooted prior to class certification);
Boyd v. Justices of Special Term, 564 F.2d 526, 527 (2d Cir. 1976) (class action dismissed where
named plaintiff's personal claim is mooted prior to class certification); Napier v. Gertrude, 542
F.2d 825, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (class action dismissed where
named plaintiffs personal claim is mooted prior to class certification).
'' Association of Data Processing Scrv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151 (1970).
16 A number of federal statutes render various types of employment discrimination il-
legal. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VII] (prohibits certain employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (prohibits certain discrimination in wage rates on the basis of sex); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (prohibits
certain employment discrimination on the basis of age); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1976) (prohibits certain racial discrimination); Civil Rights Act of' 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) (prohibits certain discrimination under color of' state law); Vocational Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-774 (1976) (prohibits certain handicap discrimination.;.
This article will focus on Title VII for several reasons. First, Title VII is the most far-reaching
and comprehensive of the federal non-discrimination obligations. C. ABERNATHY, CIvEl.
RIGHTS CASES AND MATERIALS 442 (1980). Second, in contrast with the Equal Pay Act and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, both of which have peculiar "opt-in" class action pro-
cedures, see Lachappelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), Title VII class ac-
tions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, East Texas Motor Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). Third, focusing on Title VII will provide a
concrete setting to illustrate the issues discussed without unduly confusing the discussion by
reference to other anti-discrimination laws.
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1209 ("Although one might
argue that]certain cases contain] an implication that the critical factor for Article III purposes is
the timing of class certification, other cases ... clearly demonstrate that the timing is not
crucial.").
' 8 As an illustration, a claim of employment discrimination will be considered here. This
substantive area will be explored in more depth later. See text at notes 90-123 infra. The time line
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certification" mootness); (2) after the court has refused to certify a class ("post-
denial of certification" mootness);' 9 (3) after the lawsuit is filed, but before the
court has considered the issue of class certification ("pre-certification"
mootness); 2° or (4) before the lawsuit is filed ("pre-suit" mootness). 2 ' This sec-
tion will analyze the case-by-case development of the Supreme Court's current
doctrine in the area of class action mootness, and discuss its rationale and
ramifications. The analysis will starkly illustrate the failure of the Court to ar-
ticulate a coherent doctrine in the area and the Court's concomitant, outcome-
determinative manipulation of inchoate doctrine in the area.
A. Post-Certification Mootness
The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has considered the class action
mootness issue when the named plaintiff's personal claim was lost after a class
had been certified. The basic rule, although subsequently refined, was set forth
in Sosna v. Iowa." In Sosna; the appellant's divorce petition was dismissed by an
Iowa trial court for lack of jurisdiction because she failed to meet the Iowa
statutory requirement that a petitioner in a divorce action be a resident of the
state for one year preceding the filing of the petition." Appellant then chal-
lenged the durational residency requirement in federal court on constitutional
grounds. 24
 The district court certified the class, with the appellant as the class
below highlights several significant times during the pendency of an employment discrimination
claim:
Singe: A C • D F F
alleged act
of
discrimination
filing of
complaint
filing of charge
with EEOC
issuance. of right- I
to-sue letter
I decision onl
appeal
I	 trial court	 1
determination
1 class certification I
determination
l° Post-certification and post-denial of certification occur at the same time on the time
line. See note 18 supra. The difference between the two lies in the judicial decision on the class
certification issue.
2°
 Pre-certification mootness occurs when the named plaintiffs claim becomes moot
after the complaint is filed but before the class is certified. See note 18 supra.
21 For the purpose of consistency, the terms "mootness" and "named plaintiff' will he
used. From a strictly technical standpoint, however, there is no "named plaintiff prior to suit
and, at that time, the mootness issue is classified more appropriately as a standing issue. See
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1208-09; Monaghan, Constitulional Ad-
judication.. The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973).
22 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
23 Id. at 395.
24 Id. at 395-96.
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representative, but by the time the case reached the Supreme Court the ap-
pellant's personal claim was mooted for two reasons: (1) she had been a resi-
dent of Iowa for more than one year, and (2) she had obtained a divorce in
another state. Hence, appellant was no longer adversely affected by the dura-
tional residency requirement. 25
In deciding whether the plaintiff could continue as class representative
after her personal claim had been mooted, the Sosna Court first considered the
constitutional limitation of the personal stake requirement. Noting that Article
III requires a live controversy at all times, the Court held that, after a class is
certified, the controversy may exist "between a named defendant and a
member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim
of the named plaintiff has become moot. " 26 The Court then turned its atten-
tion to the self-imposed, prudential limitation of the personal stake require-
ment. According to the Sosna Court, this limitation was overcome by reliance
on the now familiar "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to
the mootness doctrine. 27 The Court stated:
[T]he case before us is one in which state officials will undoubtedly
continue to enforce the challenged statute and yet, because of the
passage of time, no single challenger will remain subject to its restric-
tions for the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.
. We believe that a cause such as this, in which ... the issue
sought to be litigated escapes full appellate review at the behest of any
single challenger, does not inexorably become moot by the interven-
ing resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiff."
Thus, the Sosna Court held that, despite the mootness of the named plaintiff's
personal claim, the prudential limitation of the case or controversy require-
ment could be satisfied where the controversy was both likely to recur and like-
ly to be short-lived when it did recur. The Court, however, was careful to limit
the scope of the exception. It specifically noted that where "the alleged harm
would not dissipate during the normal time required for resolution of the con-
troversy, ... Art. III jurisdiction require[s] that the [named] plaintiff's personal
stake in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of the litzgalion," 29
In addition to its consideration of the personal stake requirement, the
Sosna Court also discussed whether the named plaintiff remained a proper class
representative under Rule 23. The Court limited its inquiry to whether the
named plaintiff could continue to fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class." Finding no conflicts within the class and noting that the interests of
25 Id. at 397-98.
" Id, at 402.
" See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333
n.2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See also 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE § 57.13, at 57-133-36;
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
§ 3533, at 286-89.
" 419 U.S. at 400-01.
29 Id, at 402 (emphasis added).	 .
3° Id. at 403. The Court's inquiry was iimii61 because it considered only one of the four
prerequisites to maintenance of a class action, ,Rule 23(a)(4). See text of Rule 23 at note 1 supra.
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the class had been competently urged at each level of the proceeding, the Court
held that the requirements of Rule 23(a) had been met and, hence, that the
named plaintiff could continue to represent the class. 3 ' The Court did not find
it significant that the named plaintiff was no longer a member of the class she
sought to represent. 32
 Since the named plaintiff had been a class member and
since every class member's tenure in the class was limited, the Court's resolu-
tion was another manifestation of the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception. A refusal to allow the named plaintiff to continue as the
representative of the class would have required the periodic substitution of new
class representatives and, consequently, would have resulted in unnecessary
and repeated delays.
Therefore, Sosna on its face was based on, and limited by, the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. In Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co. , 33
 however, the Supreme Court freed the doctrine
announced in Sosna from the constraints of that exception. In Franks, the issue
was whether a class of employees which had been subjected to discrimination
was entitled to seniority relief." The representative of the class, however, had
been discharged for cause and, as a result, was not eligible for the relief
sought. 35 Like the Sosna majority, the Franks Court held that the unnamed class
members had a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to satisfy the constitu-
tional aspect of the case or controversy requirement. 36 The Franks Court also
held that the prudential limitation of the case or controversy requirement had
been satisfied. Although the controversy in Franks was not of the evading
review variety, the Court found that to require "individual class members [to]
begin anew litigation on the sole issue of seniority relief would be destructive of
the ends of judicial economy and would postpone indefinitely relief which
under the law may already be long overdue.""
This latter holding in Franks was inconsistent with dicta in Sosna. Sosna had
indicated that after the personal claim of the named plaintiff had been lost, the
prudential limitation of the case or controversy requirement could be met only
if the controversy was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 38 Franks,
" 419 U.S. at 403. The rules announced by the Supreme Court in Sosna were reiterated
in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978), and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.5
(1979).
32
 419 U.S. at 403. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court required class membership
as a prerequisite to representative status. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977). See also Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216
(1974); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.0412]; C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1761.
" 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
Id. at 750. The relief sought by the members of the class was the seniority status they
would have enjoyed under the defendant company's seniority system but for the company's il-
legal discriminatory actions.
" Id. at 752-53.
36 Id. at 755-56.
" Id. at 757 n.9.
" In Sosna the Court stated that if a case was not "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," Article III required the named plaintiff to retain a personal stake in the outcome. In
Franks, the Court allowed a case to continue even though the case was not "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" and even though the named plaintiff had lost his personal stake.
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however, held that the nature of the controversy was only one factor relevant to
the personal stake determination. The Court in Franks relied on two other fac-
tors — judicial economy and remedial delays — to surmount the prudential
limitations on the Court's jurisdiction.
Perhaps more startling than this inconsistency between Franks and Sosna
was the failure of the Franks Court to mention Rule 23. While the Franks Court
determined that the plaintiff met the personal stake requirement, the Court did
not decide whether the class was adequately represented by the plaintiff under
Rule 23. As in Sosna, the plaintiff plainly could not meet the requirements of
the Rule. 39 Perhaps the Franks Court felt failure to satisfy Rule 23 was insignifi-
cant where the named plaintiff had originally been a class member. The Court,
however, failed to make any inquiry into potential conflicts within the class, a
factor which the Sosna Court relied on in allowing the plaintiff to continue to
represent the class notwithstanding her failure to meet Rule 23 standards. 4°
Moreover, the Franks Court could not rely on the fact that the substitution of a
new class representative would result in repeated delays, as had the Sosna
Court, 4 ' because the claims of individual class members in Franks were not in-
herently short-lived. Thus, there is less justification in Franks than in Sosna for
the Court's failure to demand adherence to the requirements of Rule 23.
In Kremens v. Bartley, 42
 the Supreme Court refined the inchoate, class ac-
tion mootness doctrine of Sosna and Franks. In Kremens, five mentally ill in-
dividuals, fifteen to eighteen years of age, challenged the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania statute governing the voluntary admission and commitment of
persons aged eighteen and under in state mental health facilities.'" The plain-
tiffs sought to represent a class of persons under seventeen, who had been, or
might have been, admitted or committed to such facilities." After a class had
been certified and the district court had held certain provisions of the Penn-
sylvania statute unconstitutional, a new statute was enacted which clearly
mooted the claims of the named plaintiffs and the claims of a substantial por-
tion of the unnamed class members. Some unnamed class members, however,
retained their claims even under the newly enacted statute."
The Kremens Court recognized that, after Sosna and Franks, the existence of
39 As a prerequisite to representation of a class, Rule 23 requires, inter alia, (1) a
representative plaintiff to be a member of the class he seeks to represent, East Texas Motor
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977), and (2) that the claims of the
representative plaintiff be typical of the claims of the class. Rule 23(a)(3). See text and notes at
notes 183-84 infra. The plaintiff in Franks could not meet either of these requirements.
4" Such an inquiry in Franks might have led to the disqualification of the named plaintiff
as the class representative. Because he had accumulated actual seniority with the Company, the
named plaintiff had an interest in denying judicially-mandated seniority to other class members.
Those class members who had applied for work with the company prior to the named plaintiff
would bypass the named plaintiff if judicially-mandated seniority was awarded. If judicially-
mandated seniority was denied, the other class members would remain inferior in seniority to the
named plaintiff. The named plaintiff's discharge for cause does not mitigate this conflict, since
the named plaintiff could reapply for employment.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403.
" 431 U.S 119 (1977).
" Id. at 121-22.
44 Id, at 122.
4 ' Id. at 122-27.
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"live" claims between some unnamed members of the certified class and the
defendant satisfied the requirements of Article 111. 46 Nevertheless, the Court in
Kremens refused to allow the case to continue, stating that "we have never
adopted a flat rule that the mere fact of certification of a class by a district court
was sufficient to require us to decide the merits of the claims of unnamed class
members when those of the named parties had become moot." 47 In support of
its position, the Court noted that neither'of the "critical factors" 48 permitting
review in Sosna and Franks were present in Kremens. First, the case did not fall
within the class of cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Thus, the
danger in Sosna that the controversy would never be resolved on the merits
unless the mooted named plaintiff was allowed to pursue the case was not pres-
en t. 49 The second "critical factor" mentioned in Kremens was the dubious con-
tinued validity of the certified class. 50 The Kremens Court found that only a
properly certified class could succeed to the adversarial position of a named
representative whose claim becomes moot." In both Sosna and Franks the cer-
tified class remained stable; the named plaintiff was simply no longer a
member of the class. In Kremens, however, the class itself was affected; not only
were the claims of the named plaintiff mooted but so were the claims of a
substantial number of the unnamed class members." Hence, because neither
of the "critical factors" found in Sosna and Franks were present in Kremens, the
Court would not allow the class action to continue. Rather, the Kremens Court
remanded the case to the district court for reconside-ration of the class defini-
tion, exclusion of those whose claims were moot, and substitution of class
representatives with live claims."
The "critical factor" analysis forwarded in Kremens inadequately
distinguishes Sosna and Franks. First, the Kremens Court's reliance on the
"evading review" factor is unconvincing because Franks, like Kremens, did not
fall within the class of cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review," and
yet review in Franks was permitted. 54 In making its decision, the Court in
Kremens did not even consider the reasons given in Franks for allowing review,
namely, judicial economy and prompt judicial relief." Second, the "properly
46 Id at 134,
at Id. at 130.
" Id. at 133.
49
 Id. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 399-402.
5" 431 U.S. at 133.
5 ' Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 135. It is unclear from the Court's discussion whether the Court declined to
review the merits in Kremens because of the prudential limitation of the personal stake require-
ment or because the case failed to maintain compliance with the requirements of Rule 23. The
Court's disposition supports the conclusion that the case satisfied the Article III requirements. See
431 U.S. at 134 n.15; Champlin, Personal Stake and Justiciability: Application to the Moot Class Action,
27 KAN. L. R FA', 85, f38 n.20 (1978) 'hereinafter cited as Champlin (If review is impossible
because mootness undermines the Article III basis for a lawsuit, federal courts vacate the judg-
ment of the lower court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.).
" Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 757 n.9.
Judicial economy would have been served to some extent by permitting judicial
review in Kremens. The issues had been tried below and briefed extensively in the Supreme
Court. A countervailing factor would have been the change in issues since the time of the district
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certified class" factor, like the "evading review" factor, does not adequately
distinguish Sosna and Franks from Kremens. In Sosna and Franks, as in Kremens,
the propriety of the certified class was undermined as soon as the named plain-
tiff's claim became moot. 56 The Kremens Court gave no reasons, in law or
policy, why the impropriety of the class certification in Kremens rendered the
case unreviewable on the merits, while the impropriety of the class certification
in Sosna and Franks did not."
Although the rationale is suspect, the "rules" of Sosna, Franks, and
Kremens governing post-certification mootness of the named plaintiff's personal
claim appear relatively clear. After a class has been certified, the controversy
between unnamed class members and the defendant will satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement of Article III. This alone, however does not insure the con-
tinuation of the lawsuit. In addition, certain "critical factors" must be present,
such as a controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review," or the con-
tinued existence of a "properly certified class." If such "critical factors" arc
present, the case will be allowed to go forward with the named plaintiff
continuing his representation of the class, despite the mootness of his claim, so
long as he can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. If the
"critical factors" are not present, the case will be remanded so that the class
can be redefined and a new class representative, with a live claim, can be
su bstituted.
B. Post-Denial of Certification Mootness
While Sosna, Franks, and Kremens dealt with moonless of a named
plaintiff's claim occurring after a court has certified the class, such moonless
can also occur after a court has denied class certification. In two recent cases
court decision. The legislative change would have required the Supreme Court to consider issues
that were not presented below.
" See text at notes 183-84 infra.
57 The Court in Kremens made a vague allusion to "disputes ... so unfocused as to make
informed resolution of them almost impossible." 431 U.S. at 134. Unquestionably, the regula-
tions and statute that were enacted subsequent to initiation of the suit in Kremens rendered the
case more complex. The statute in effect when the lawsuit was initially filed made few or no
distinctions based on the age of the juvenile. Id. at 124-25. The subsequently enacted regulations
and statutes made such distinctions. Id. at 125-26. In addition, the new statute repealed the
challenged provisions of the original statute except insofar as they related to mentally retarded
persons. Id, at 126. Consequently, the case was rendered more complex because the validity of
the claims of unnamed class members varied depending on the individual class member's age
and on whether he was committed for mental illness or mental retardation. Id. at 130-31. In-
creased complexity, however, does not equal "unfocused" disputes. Indeed, in Kremens the in-
creased complexity probably created disputes that were more focused. Under the original statute,
even though the statute itself made no distinctions based on age, the cominitment procedures re-
quired by the Constitution may have varied depending on whether a three-year-old or an
eighteen-year-old was being committed. See Champlin, supra note 53, at 102. Moreover, the com-
mitment procedures required for an eighteen-year-old may have varied depending on whether
the commitment was, for example, for mental retardation which was manifested continuously or
for mental illness which was manifested only intermittently. Thus, the subsequently enacted
regulations and statute which made distinctions based on age and the reasons for commitment
may have aided the courts in focusing on factors relevant to a resolution of the dispute. Conse-
quently, the vague allusion in Kremens to "disputes ... so unfocused as to make informed resolu-
tion of them almost impossible" is not helpful in distinguishing Kremens from Sosna and Franks.
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the Supreme Court considered the latter situation and determined that a
named plaintiff could appeal the denial of class certification despite the moot-
ness of his personal claim.
In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,5 8 the named plaintiffs were the
holders of credit cards issued by the defendant bank." The named plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had made usurious finance charges against their ac-
counts and the accounts of a putative class of approximately 90,000 other credit
card holders." The district court, however, denied the named plaintiff's mo-
tion for class certification. 61 The defendant then tendered to each named plain-
tiff the maximum amount that each could have recovered." The named plain-
tiffs refused the tender, but the district court entered judgment in their favor on
the basis of the tender and dismissed the action." On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the defendant argued that the induced mootness precluded the named
plaintiffs from obtaining review of the class certification ruling." The Supreme
Court disagreed. The Court noted that even after the defendant's attempt to
moot the action, the named plaintiffs retained an interest in shifting part of the
costs of the litigation to those who would share in its benefits if a class was cer-
tified and ultimately prevailed." The Court held that this residual interest was
sufficient to permit the named plaintiffi to appeal the adverse certification
ruling, even though their individual claims were satisfied through the entry of
the judgment over their objections. 66
In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghly, 67 the Court expanded its
holding in Roper by recognizing an even more tenuous interest as sufficient to
overcome alleged post-denial of certification mootness. The named plaintiff in
Geraghty, a federal prisoner who twice had been denied parole, challenged the
validity of the United States Parole Commission's Parole Release Guidelines."
The district court denied the named plaintiff's request for class certification
and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the merits. 69 The named
plaintiff was released from prison during the pendency of the appeal and, as a
result, the defendants claimed the action was moot." Once again, the Supreme
Court disagreed. The Court refused to distinguish between cases in which the
alleged mootness was caused by a judgment, as in Roper, and cases in which the
alleged mootness was caused by the "expiration" of the named plaintiff's
claim, as in Geraghly. 71 Rather, the Supreme Court expanded the Roper holding
' 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980).
" Id. at 1168.
6° Id.
6 ' Id. at 1169.
62 Id.
63 Id.
" Id. at 1169-70.
" Id. at 1173-74.
" Id. at 1173-75. See also United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1210
("Mhe Court holds [in Roper] that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied through entry of
judgment over their objections may appeal the denial of a class certification ruling.").
67 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980).
68 Id. at 1206.
69 Id. at 1206-07.
7° Id, at 1207-08.
71 Id. at 1211.
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by deciding that a named plaintiff's interest in his claim that he is entitled to
represent a class insufficient to allow him to appeal an adverse certification rul-
ing, despite the mootness of his personal claim. 72 The Court's holding in
Geraghty, narrowly construed, is that when a district court erroneously denies a
claim of class certification which, if correctly decided, would have prevented
the action from becoming moot, the named plaintiff can appeal the denial and
the corrected ruling will relate back to the date of the original denial."
Roper and Geraghty both recognize tenuous interests as sufficient to permit
named plaintiffs to appeal adverse class certification rulings. In Roper the in-
terest in shifting the costs of litigation was tenuous on the facts. Counsel in the
case agreed to a contingency fee of twenty-five percent (25%). 74 As a result, the
named plaintiffs' interest in shifting costs was de minimis. In Geraghty, the in-
terest recognized by the Court was a mere procedural claim — the named
plaintiff's interest in his claim that he was entitled to represent a class. Even the
majority in Geraghty admitted that such an interest is rarely sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Article III." The impetus for the Roper and Geraghty deci-
sions, then, obviously was not the overwhelming strength of the residual in-
terests of the named plaintiffs. Rather, the impetus was another decision of the
Court, Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay. 76 In Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court
held that an order denying class certification was not subject to interlocutory
appeal as of right. As a result, • in Roper and Geraghty, where class certification
had been denied and the named plaintiff subsequently had lost on the merits,
the Supreme Court was forced (1) to dismiss the appeal because the named
plaintiff's claim was moot, thus rendering unreviewable the district court's
class certification ruling; or (2) to allow the appeal by relying on a tenuous in-
terest to avoid mootness of the named plaintiff's claim. The Court opted for the
latter even though it raised the spectre of "spurious" class actions."
Thus, the "rule" for post-denial of certification mootness is that the
72 Id.
" Id. at 1212-13 n.11.
" Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1180 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" United States Parole Comm' n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1211.
76 437 U.S. 463 (1978). See generally Note, Satterwhite v. City of Greenville and Breathing
New Life into the Headless Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 743, 756-58 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
New Life].
" In "spurious" class actions under the original Rule 23, some courts permitted
members of the class to intervene after an adjudication on the merits favorable to their interests,
even though they would not have been bound by an adverse decision, See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL.
PRACTICE §§ 23.11 [3], 23.12. Roper and Geraghty may permit a similar tactic. If class certification
is denied, unnamed class members would not be bound by an adverse determination on the
merits. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1789. The
defendant would not be in a position to seek reversal of the class certification ruling since he
prevailed on that issue at the class certification stage. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOKER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 5 3901 (a party may not appeal from a
decision in his favor). If, however, the named plaintiff is successful on the merits, Roper and
Geraghty presumbly would allow the named plaintiff or an intervening, unnamed class member,
see United Airlines v. McDonald, 431 U.S. 385 (1977), to appeal the class certification denial in
an attempt to share the fruits of the favorable decision. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100
S. Ct. at 1172; id. at 1182 (Powell, J., dissenting). United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
100 S. Ct. at 1212.
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named plaintiff's interest in shifting litigation costs or in his claim that he is en-
titled to represent a class is sufficient to enable him to appeal the denial of class
certification, even though his personal claim has expired. If he loses that ap-
peal, the claim on the merits must be dismissed as moot. If he wins the appeal,
the class certification relates back to the date of the original denial and he
stands in the same position as the named plaintiff in Sosna. 78
C. Pre-Certification and Pre-Suit Mootness
While the Supreme Court has allowed named plaintiffs to continue suits
following post-certification or post-denial of certification mootness, it has
reacted differently when pre-suit and pre-certification mootness has occurred.
The Court has ruled that where the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot
before a lawsuit is filed" or after a lawsuit is filed but before the certification
issue is considered," such mootness will undermine the plaintiff's ability to
78 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 1214. The continued
vitality of another Supreme Court opinion, Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), is ques-
tionable after Geraghty. See United States Parole Comm' n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1210 n.7; id.
at 1219-20 (Powell, J., dissenting). The facts in Weinstein were similar to those in Geraghty. In
Weinstein, the named plaintiff claimed that the defendants, members of the North Carolina
Board of Parole, had denied him certain procedural rights in considering his eligibility for parole.
423 U.S. at 147. After denying the named plaintiff's motion for class certification, the district
court sustained his claim that he was constitutionally entitled to certain procedural rights. Id. The
defendants attempted to appeal, but by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the named
plaintiff had been released from prison. Id. at 147-48. The Supreme Court, noting the mootness,
refused to review the case. Id. at 149. Thus, in Weinstein the named plaintiff was asserting
mootness to avoid review in a post-denial of certification situation, while in Geraghty it was the
defendant who was asserting the mootness defense.
Geraghty either overrules or does not overrule Weinstein. If it does overrule Weinstein,
Weinstein is instructive as an illustration of the responsibilities a named plaintiff may assume
when he seeks to represent a class. See note 172 infra. Specifically, a named plaintiff in the posi-
tion of the named plaintiff in Weinstein may be required to pursue the litigation even though his
personal interest in the case is greatly diminished. If Geraghty does not overrule Weinstein, Wein-
stein stands as either an historical footnote of passing interest to litigation strategists or as a star-
tling aspect of personal stake doctrine. If Weinstein was not overruled because the defendants
sought to challenge the merits of the proceeding on review and not merely, as in Geraghty, the
class certification decision, Weinstein is an historical footnote. It instructs litigation strategists on
the proper manner in which to seek appeal in a post-denial or certification situation. If, however,
Weinstein was not overruled because the named plaintiff, rather than the defendant as in Geraghty,
forwarded the mootness claim, Weinstein is a startling aspect of personal stake doctrine.
Specifically, a named plaintiff in a post-denial of certification situation has the option of either
refraining or shedding his personal stake in the action and the defendant simply has no control
over the exercise of that option,
Geraghty appears to favor the historical footnote option noted above. United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1210 n.7. That avoids the startling personal stake interpreta-
tion noted above and delays Supreme Court consideration of the fiduciary responsibilities of class
representation.
79
 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Control Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
72 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1975); United States v. Stu -dents Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 (1973); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
8°
 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1976); Board of
School Comm' rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1975). See generally Comment, The Headless
Class Action.. The Effect of a Named Plaintiff's Pre-Certification Loss of a Personal Stake, 39 Mb. L. REV.
121 (1979) (hereinafter cited as,pre-Certification .Loss).
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proceed with the action. The Court recognizes only one exception to the pre-
certification rule. Under this exception, if the claims of the named plaintiff are
so inherently transitory that the trial court does not even have time to rule on
the class certification issue before the named plaintiff's claim is rendered moot,
the trial court can consider the class certification issue and its determination
will relate back to the date of the filing of the complaint, thus allowing con-
tinuation of the suit. 8 1 This exception is merely another manifestation of the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" consideration discussed earlier."
The Supreme Court's treatment of pre-suit and pre-certification mootness
exposes horizontal inequities" in current Supreme Court doctrine. In post-
certification and post-denial of certification situations, the Court has recog-
nized tenuous interests of the named plaintiff and of unnamed class members
as sufficient to satisfy the personal stake requirement. The Court, without ex-
planation refuses to recognize those same interests in pre-suit and pre-
certification mootness situations. In Raper and Geraghty, the Court recognized
the named plaintiff's interest in allocating attorney's fees and representing a
class as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III. The interests
recognized in Roper and Geraghty, however, are present before, as well as after,
the trial court considers the class certification issue. Indeed, they may be pres-
ent before the lawsuit is filed, particularly in employment discrimination
lawsuits. For example, assume Applicant A files a charge of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination against the SLW Company. 84 The charge alleges that
SLW discriminated against A and a class of similarly situated job applicants.
Upon investigation, the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe SLW has
discriminated against A and the class. A's attorney is active during the con-
ciliation process; nevertheless, the matter cannot be resolved. The EEOC
issues a right-to-sue letter, but the day before the lawsuit is filed, SLW hires A
and fully compensates him for all the losses he alleged. This is a situation of
pre-suit mootness, but the interests noted in Roper (allocation of attorney's fees)
and Geraghty (right to represent a class) are as sharply presented as they were in
81 For example, assume that a named plaintiff files a class action challenging the con-
stitutional validity of his pre-trial detention. Since the length of pre-trial custody cannot be ascer-
tained at the outset and since it can be ended at any time, it is uncertain that any individual will
remain in pre-trial detention long enough for a judge to certify a class. Consequently, even if the
named plaintiff is released from pre-trial custody prior to class certification, he should be able to
pursue the class action despite the mootness of his persona] claim. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 110-11 (1975). See also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S 204, 213-14 n.11 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. at 402 n.11.
es
	text at notes 27-29 supra. It should be briefly noted that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned the use of a "relation back" in two situations and that the relation back operates dif-
ferently in each situation. In a post-denial of certification situation, the Court has sanctioned a
relation back to the date of the original denial of certification. United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1212-13 n.11. In a pre-certification situation where the claim is capable
of repetition, yet evading review, the Court has approved a relation back to the time of the filing
of the complaint. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 110-11 n.11 (1975). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975).
" "Horizontal inequities" refers to inequities that result when cases are treated dif-
ferently merely because the named plaintiffs' claims moot at different times.
" The SLW Co. is a fictional company. Any resemblance to an actual company is pure-
ly coincidental and wholly unintentional.
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the post-denial of certification circumstances presented in those cases. Thus, it
could be argued that Applicant A has sufficient interest in pursuing his class
claims to satisfy the requirements of Article III and he, too, should be placed in
the same position as the named plaintiff in Roper and Geraghty; that is, he should
be entitled to pursue his claim for class certification. If he should lose, the case
would be dismissed as moot. If he should win, the focus would be "shift[ed]
... from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative
to 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' "65
 Yet, despite the
presence of the same interests identified in Roper and Geraghty, the Court has
been unwilling to recognize the continuing personal stake of the named plain-
tiff in instances of pre-suit and pre-certification mootness.
Similar horizontal inequities are apparent in the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the interests of unnamed class members in the continuance of a mooted
class action. In cases of post-certification mootness, the Court has found the in-
terest of unnamed class members sufficient to satisfy Article III requirements. 86
Yet the Supreme Court has been unwilling to consider the interests of un-
named class members in pre-suit and pre-certification mootness cases. As the
hypothetical above illustrates, however, unnamed class members have the
same interest in the named plaintiff's — Applicant A's — suit prior to the filing
of the complaint as they would have at the post-certification stage. 87
These horizontal inequities in the treatment of named plaintiffs and un-
named class members expose the Court's case-by-case manipulation of per-
sonal stake doctrine. In these cases, the Supreme Court is not examining the
interests of the named plaintiff and unnamed class members to determine
whether they measure up to the personal stake standards. Rather, the Court is
utilizing Article III rhetoric to make hidden policy choices, such as permitting
judicial review of class certification determinations in Roper and Geraghty" and
enhancing judicial economy and ensuring prompt judicial relief in Sosna and
Franks. 89
 The practical application of the Court's decisions, and the practical
effect of the horizontal inequities created thereby, is best illustrated by
reference to class actions in a specific, substantive area.
II. COMPETING INTERESTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS
This section will focus on class actions within the field of employment
discrimination. After a consideration of the importance of class actions in the
employment discrimination area, the interests of the various parties in these
class actions will be discussed. Based upon this discussion, it will be proposed
that the Court's resolution of mooted class action issues does not sufficiently
satisfy these interests.
At the outset, it should be noted that the class action is a particularly
" United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1214 (quoting Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403).
° See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 402; Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at
755-56.
" See text at notes 106-11 infra.
" See text at notes 76-77 supra.
" See text at note 37 supra.
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useful and valuable tool for combatting illegal employment discrimination.
The class action in employment discrimination lawsuits, as in other types of ac-
tions, provides a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar
lawsuits and facilitates the spreading of litigation costs among numerous
litigants with similar claims. 90 In addition, since "suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide
wrongs," 9 ' the class action enables victims of discrimination to attack those
classwide wrongs and seek classwide remedies. 92
 In employment discrimina-
tion litigation, the class action has particular value, since it may ease the
evidentiary showing necessary to establish a substantive claim of employment
discrimination. 93
 Moreover, it makes possible the revival of claims that would
be time barred but for the class action mechanism." Thus, limits on the ability
of a named plaintiff with a mooted personal claim to continue litigation on
behalf of a class hamper to some extent enforcement of the federal non-
discrimination obligation. Conversely, an interpretation of Rule 23 and the
9' United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1211.
9 ' East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 405 (1977).
92 Classwide remedies are essential to combat systemic or wide-ranging employment
discrimination:
Suppose that some group has been identified as suffering from a denial of equal
opportunities. How is the situation to be corrected? Imagine a race where some
racers have been assigned a heavy weight to carry because they belong to a par-
ticular group. Because of this handicap the average runner with weights will lag
behind the average runner without weights, but some runners with weights will
come out ahead of some runners without weight. Now suppose someone waves a
magic wand and the weights are lifted from the backs of all runners. If the two
groups of runners are equal in ability the mean difference between the weighted
and unweighted groups ceases to expand but those who suffered from the earliest
discrimination will never catch up. If this is a race where parents who are ahead
are able to hand the baton to their children, there is no equalization of the race
even across generations. The race can be made fair only if everyone is forced to
stop and begin again at the same starting line, if those without weights are forced
to carry weights until the differences in average group-performances disappear, or
if those who have been handicapped in the past are given special privileges until
they catch up.
Thorow, A Theory of Groups and Economic Redistribution, 9 Piiit.osomv & PUBLIC AFFAIRS '25, 35
(1979).
9 ' To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in a private non-class
discrimination suit the individual plaintiff must meet the live-part test set forth by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). One element of the
five-part test is a demonstration by the plaintiff that he is qualified for the position being sought.
Id. In a class action, the plaintiff class can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by
creating an inference of employment discrimination through the use of statistical proof.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S 299, 307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). Once a prima facie case has beets
established, the individual class member need only show that he unsuccessfully applied for a job
to become eligible for individual relief. 431 U.S. at 362. The individual class member need not
show that he is qualified for the job being sought. Id. at 362. Thus, availability of the class action
device may ease the showing necessary to establish a substantive claim of employment
discrimination. See Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 969-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens and Co., 585 F.2d 625, 636.38 (4th Cir. 1978).
94 See text and notes at notes 108-09 infra.
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personal stake requirement that permits such lawsuits to continue aids the en-
forcement effort.
The value of the class action mechanism to employment discrimination
litigation, however, can best be demonstrated through an examination of the
interests of the various parties to an employment discrimination class action.
Consideration of a prototypical employment discrimination case will facilitate
such an examination. Assume that Employee A, an employee of the SLW Co.,
thinks she has been denied a promotion because of her sex. She retains an at-
torney and promptly files a charge of discrimination against the SLW Co. with
the EEOC. Employee A claims not only that SLW has discriminated against
her, but also that SLW has discriminated against a class composed of all
females who have been denied promotions by SLW. The EEOC investigates
Employee A's charge and finds reasonable cause to believe that SLW has
discriminated against both Employee A and the class. After completing an un-
successful conciliation process, the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to
Employee A. Employee A files a class action in federal district court. On a mo-
tion for summary judgment filed by SLW, the court finds that Employee A has
no personal claim against SLW because she was unable to demonstrate that she
was qualified for the job she sought. At this point, the court is faced with the
class action mootness issues. Should the lawsuit be allowed to continue? If so,
should Employee A be allowed to represent the putative class?
Resolution of the class action mootness issues will depend on the manner
in which the competing interests of four entities are accommodated. First, the
interests of Employee A, the named plaintiff, must be considered. By definition
in mooted class actions, Employee A's personal claim has been mooted. Never-
theless, although undercut to some extent, Employee A's interests remain
significant. If Employee A retains interests sufficient to meet the requirements
of Article III and Rule 23 despite the loss of her personal claim, the suit may
continue without an inquiry into the interests of unnamed class members. Sec-
ond, as adumbrated above, the interests of unnamed class members merit ex-
amination. Even if Employee A no longer has a sufficient interest to justify con-
tinuation of the lawsuit, perhaps the interests of unnamed class members in the
expeditious prosecution of their claims should be recognized. Third, the SLW
Co. has an obvious interest in avoiding both the employment discrimination
litigation itself and the concomitant potential liability. Finally, the broader in-
tests of the public are significant. The public has an interest in a just enforce-
ment of the non-discrimination obligation, as well as an interest in the broader
public policies allegedly furthered by the personal stake requirement and by
Rule 23. The following paragraphs will explicate further the interests of these
four entities.
As noted above, 95 the Supreme Court in Roper and Geraghty liberally con-
strued Employee A's residual interests. Allowing mooted class actions to con-
tinue, the Court recognized the named plaintiff's interest in (1) shifting "to
successful class litigants a portion of those fees and expenses that have been in-
curred in [the] litigation and for which they assert a continuing obligation" 96
" See text at notes 58-78 supra.
96 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1171 n.6.
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and (2) obtaining class certification." Both of these interests take on an added
significance in employment discrimination class actions.
The interest of the named plaintiff in shifting attorneys' fees will in most
cases be greater in employment discrimination class actions than it was in
Roper. In Roper, the interest was minimal because the plaintiffs had entered into
a contingent fee agreement whereby they and other class members would pay
25% of their recovery to counsel. Consequently, the named plaintifis only
continuing interest was in shifting other, albeit unspecified, costs and ex-
penses." In employment discrimination cases, however, a named plaintiff who
is able to prevail on his class allegations despite the loss of his personal claim,
may be able to shift at least some portion of his costs and expenses, including
attorneys' fees, to the defendant. 99 Thus, Employee A has an interest in pursu-
ing class allegations despite the loss of her personal claim because success on
the class allegations may allow her to shift some portion of her attorneys' fees to
the defendant.
Similarly, in some circumstances the interest of the named plaintiff in ob-
taining class certification may be greater in employment discrimination
lawsuits than it was in Geraghty. In the hypothetical, for example, Employee A's
personal claim failed because she was unable to demonstrate that she was
qualified for the job she sought. If Employee A is allowed to pursue her class
claims and can create an inference of discrimination against the class, she no
longer needs to demonstrate that she was qualified for the job to prevail. That
burden is shifted to the SLW Co.'°° As a result, because of the differences in
the evidentiary proof required for individual and class claims,'°' Employee A's
interest in obtaining class certification is substantial.'"
97 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1211.
9" 100 S. Ct. at 1180 (Powell, J., dissenting).
99 Title VII provides for an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Section 706(k) of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (provides for awards of at-
torney's fees for suits brought to enforce rights under the 19th-century civil rights laws). The
courts differ as to what are reasonable attorney's fees for plaintiffs who only partially prevail.
Some courts limit fees to the extent of the victory, see Walker v. Robbins Hose Co., No. 1, 23
END 1 30,965, at 15,981 (3d Cir. 1980); Ridgewater v. United Hosp.-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923,
928 (8th Cir, 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co., 444 F. Supp. 890, 895 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Boyd v.
Ozark Airlines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Ruckel v. Essex Intl, Inc., 14
FEP Cas, 403, 413 (N.D. Ind. 1976), while others do not penalize the plaintiff for unsuccessful
time spent, see Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1977); Saracini v.
Missouri Pacific R.R., 431 F. Supp. 389, 398 (E.D. Ark. 1977). Nevertheless, even in jurisdic-
tions where the courts limit fees to the extent of the victory, the named plaintiff may be able to
shift a portion of his costs and expenses if the unsuccessful individual claims and the successful
class claims depended on a common nucleus of operative facts and the time spent by the
plaintiff's attorney on the successful claims cannot he reasonably segregated. Cooper v. Curtis,
16 EPD 1 8099, at 4512 (D.D.C. 1978).
'°° International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (197). See note
93 supra.
L 01 See note 93 supra.
102 The class of cases in which Employee A's interest in obtaining class certification is
greater than the named plaintiff's in Geraghty is admittedly quite small. It encompasses only those
cases in which the named plaintiff's personal employment discrimination claim fails because of
an inability to demonstrate qualifications for the job sought and in which the defendant employer
is subsequently unable to demonstrate lack of qualification for the job sought. Presumably, in the
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Employee A also has other residual interests in continuing the lawsuit. As
an employee of SLW, she has an interest in the "important benefits'"°3 flow-
ing from a sexually — or racially — balanced workforce. 104 Moreover, to the
extent employment discrimination laws foresee a more generalized, societal
benefit from the upgrading of the relative economic positions of protected
groups,'°5 Employee A has a minimal residual interest, as a member of the
society benefited, in the continuation of her lawsuit.
The interests of the unnamed class members in Employee A's suit against
SLW are perhaps more substantial than Employee A's residual interests. Title
VII has two prerequisites to the filing of a federal court action: (1) the timely
filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) the timely filing of a
court action after receiving a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC. 1 °6 Failure
to fulfill the procedural prerequisites within the statutory time limits, however,
does not preclude unnamed class members from recovery. A named plaintiff,
such as Employee A, who has fulfilled the procedural prerequisites can obtain
relief on behalf of class members who have not.'" Thus, unnamed class
members who have not fulfilled the procedural prerequisites to suit in a timely
fashion retain a substantial interest in the continuation of the class action even
after Employee A's personal claim expires. If the alleged discrimination is con-
tinuing in nature — and thus the bringing of an action by a class member
would not be time barred under Title VII — the unnamed class members still
retain an interest in the continuation of the class action. Their interest in such a
situation is to extend the period of potential backpay as far into the past as
possible. 108 If the alleged discrimination is a completed act — and class
majority of employment discrimination class actions, the interest of the named plaintiff in obtain-
ing class certification is the same as the interest of the named plaintiff in Geraghty.
'°' Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (existing
tenants found to have standing to challenge allegedly illegal exclusion of minorities from housing
complex based on allegation of injury from loss of "important benefits" of interracial associa-
tions).
'° 4
 Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Horn v.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 277 (10th Cir. 1977).
'" 5 Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237-40, 244-49
(1971).
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
'" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
1 " Assume, for example, a situation in which the SLW Co., maintains a policy of re-
fusing to promote women into a job classification. On January 1, 1980, Employee A filed her
charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination against herself and a class of similarly situated
women. Employees B, C, and D rely on A's charge and do not file charges themselves. Employee
A receives a "right-to-sue" letter on December 1, 1980 and promptly files a suit in federal court.
On January 1, 1981, the court finds that Employee A was not qualified for the promotion and
dismisses Employee 'A's individual claim. Since the discriminatory policy is still in effect,
Employees B, C, and D can file a new charge with the EEOC on January 1, 1981. Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.'972 (1975). But if they
do so and the company is later found to have violated Title VII, the company's backpay liability
will accrue from January 1, 1979 — a date two years prior to the filing of the charge with the
EEOC. Section 706(g) of Title VII, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5(g). On the other hand, if
B, C, and D can continue A's suit, despite the loss of her personal claim, and the company is
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members are time barred from bringing an action under Title VII — the un-
named class members' interest is in maintaining an otherwise time barred ac-
tion. 1 °9
In addition to the two interests noted above, some unnamed class
members may have other reasons for favoring continuation of Employee A's
lawsuit. For example, they may want to insure their anonymity in an action
against defendants with whom they have continuing necessary relationships. 110
Moreover, the continuation of Employee A's lawsuit may allow unnamed class
members to get two bites at the proverbial apple. On the one hand, if
Employee A wins the class suit, the unnamed class members can come forward
to claim their share of the relief awarded. On the other hand, if Employee A
loses the class suit, the unnamed class members can argue that Employee A's
suit should have only a limited, adverse res judicata effect and that, hence, they
should not be barred from pursuing anew their claims."'
The SLW Co., however, has interests which counterpoise the interests of
unnamed class members. As previously noted, allowing Employee A's suit to
continue may have the effect of allowing an otherwise time barred suit to con-
tinue or of extending the period of backpay liability. The defendant has a
legitimate interest in an interpretation of the time limit provisions of Title VII
later found to be liable, the company's backpay liability will accrue from January 1, 1978 — a
date two years prior to the filing of A's charge with the EEOC. Id. See New Life, supra note 76, at
754-56.
105 Assume the same circumstances as in note 108, but assume in addition that the SLW
Company revised the discriminatory policy on December 1, 1979, and commencing on that date
promoted women into the job classification on a non-discriminatory basis. In this situation, when
Employee A's individual claim is dismissed, Employee B, C, and D would be time barred from
filing a new charge with the EEOC because Title VII requires that a charge be filed within 180
days of the discriminatory act. Section 706(e) of Title VII, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(e)
(assuming the discrimination occurred in a state without a fair employment practices agency with
authority to grant or seek relief). The general rule that the statute of limitations on the individual
causes of action of unnamed class members is tolled from the date of filing of the class action com-
plaint, American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-56 (1974), provides little com-
fort to B, C, and D. Because of the shortness of the time limits under Title VII, and because Title
VII, to further its conciliation goals, requires a significant time delay between the time a charge is
filed and the time a complaint can be filed in court by a private party, sections 706(b), (c), and
(f)(1) of Title VII, as codified in 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(b), (e), (f)(1), the individual claims of un-
named class members are generally time barred before the class action complaint is filed. Thus,
unless II, C, and D can continue Employee A's lawsuit despite the expiration of Employee A's in-
dividual cause of action, they will be unable to pursue the alleged discrimination. See New Life,
supra note 76, at 754-56.
"° See Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 998 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 100
S. Ct. 1334 (1980); Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
"' The res judicata argument of the unnamed class members can take several forms.
First, they can claim that, because of Employee A's obvious lack of class membership and
typicality, they received inadequate representation in Employee A's class action and should not
be bound by it. Second, they can claim a judgment on classwide Title VII claims should have no
res judicala effect on their individual claims. Third, they can claim the adverse judgment in
Employee A's class action should bar only injunctive, but not monetary relief. See Note, Due Proc-
ess Rights of Absentees in Title VII Class Actions — The Myth of Homogeneity of Interest, 59 B.U. L. REV.
661, 685-86 (1979). See also Note, Class Actions.. Certification and Notice Requirements, 68 GEO. L. J.
1009, 1027-35 (1980).
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that limits, to the greatest extent possible, the retroactive reach of the Act. In
another context, the Supreme Court has recognized this interest:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is
the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the
statute was passed. . [I]t is merely an unfortunate event in
history which has no present legal consequences."'
Thus, the SLW Co. has an interest, noted approvingly by the Supreme Court,
in avoiding liability for allegedly discriminatory acts that were not promptly
prosecuted by the alleged discrimination victims. In addition, the defendant
has an interest in limiting the number of persons who can bring and/or con-
tinue employment discrimination lawsuits. To the extent Article III and Rule
23 requirements are eased, defendants are exposed to a greater risk of litigation_
because the class of potential plaintiffs increases."' Defendants have an in-
terest in avoiding such litigation, whether or not it eventually results in liabili-
ty." 4
 Moreover, since the representative status of Employee A is questionable
at best, 15
 the SLW Co. has an interest in concluding the suit because even if
SLW wins the suit, it may not preclude subsequent suits by unnamed class
members. " 6
Finally, after focusing on the interests of the named plaintiff, the unnamed
class members, and the defendant, the broader interests of the public in
Employee A's suit must be considered. The public has a special interest in
employment discrimination lawsuits. The elimination of employment
discrimination is a societal goal that has been expressed in myriad state and
federal laws. Consequently, the public has an interest in a resolution of the
class action mootness issue which furthers this goal. Since a resolution ter-
minating the lawsuit could hinder or block the ability of unnamed class
members to litigate the employment discrimination issue," 7 this public interest
weighs in favor of allowing Employee A's suit to continue." 5 Nevertheless,
12
 United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
Although the actual increase in the risk of litigation will be dependent on a number of
factors, including the number of potential plaintiffs, an increase in potential plaintiffs does in-
crease to some extent the company's potential exposure to litigation.
" 4
 Even if the litigation does not result in a finding of liability, the defendant will
undergo considerable expense and his chances for recovering such expense arc not good. See
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (defendants cannot recover at-
torney's fees unless action was unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious).
13 See text at notes 183-84 infra.
See note 111 supra. Of course, if subsequent judicial decisions increase the certainty
of the res judicala effect of the judgment in Employee A's class suit, the SLW Co. may prefer the
continuation of Employee A's suit, particularly if the Company feels that it is likely to prevail
and/or that unnamed class members are quite likely to pursue their claims.
117
 See notes 108-09 supra.
."" The class representative in employment discrimination lawsuits is seeking to vin-
dicate the public interest as a "private attorney general." The phrase "private attorney general"
was first coined in a case which did not involve employment discrimination. Associated In-
dustries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated and remanded, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
The phrase, however, does describe accurately plaintiffs in employment discrimination lawsuits
and, consequently, has been used in countless Title VII cases. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment
Co, v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman v. Figgie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968).
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countervailing public interests can be found in Title VIPs conciliation pro-
cedures and time limitations. Title VII has a clearly stated conciliation policy
intended to minimize the disruptive effect and expense of employment
discrimination disputes." 9 If Employee A is allowed to continue the suit, the
employment discrimination issue will have reached court without any concilia-
tion between the SLW Co. and the allegedly adversely affected parties, that is,
the unnamed class members. 120 Thus, while the public interest in eliminating
employment discrimination supports a continuation of the suit by Employee A,
the public interest in conciliation weighs in favor of dismissing Employee A's
suit and requiring unnamed class members to conciliate their claims before be-
ing allowed to litigate them in the federal courts.
Along with its interest in eliminating employment discrimination and in
promoting conciliation between the employer and his employees, the public
also has interests in Employee A's suit which are not limited to employment
discrimination lawsuits. The personal stake requirement is said to enhance the
public interest in the separation of powers,' 2 ' integrity of the decision-making
process' 22
 and economy of judicial resources.' 23 These public interests weigh in
favor of limiting Employee A's ability to continue her lawsuit after her personal
claim becomes moot.
In summary, the four sets of interests discussed above — those of the
named plaintiff, the unnamed class members, the defendant, and the public —
interact and sometimes collide when an employment discrimination class ac-
tion is "mooted." The current Supreme Court resolution of the mooted class
action issues, however, does not adequately accommodate these interests.
Rather, the Supreme Court overemphasizes the interests of the named plaintiff
by clinging to the vestiges of an outdated notion of personal stake, while under-
mining Rule 23 requirements that are intended to protect unnamed class
members, defendants and the public. The following section will, through an
19 See § 706 of Title VII, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5 (1976).
120 If Employee A's class claims were fully considered during the conciliation process
between Employee A and the SLW Co., allowing Employee A to continue her suit will have only
a minimal adverse effect on the conciliation process. See note 209 infra.
' 2 ' The separation of powers interest surfaces when constitutional adjudication may lead
to a conflict between coordinate branches of the government. For example, in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), certain citizens challenged the Reserve
membership of members of Congress under the incompatibility clause of the Constitution, which
provides in part that no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. The case in-
volved constitutional adjudication which could have resulted in a confrontation between the
judicial and legislative branches of government. In the absence of a concrete injury to the citizen-
plaintiff, the Court denied standing. 418 U.S. at 216-27. See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 324-26 (1936); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1911),
122 The personal stake requirement is thought to "assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164, 172-73. But see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 22.04 (3d ed,
1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
' 23 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court — A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
670-83 (1973); Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 H ARV. L. REv. 1672, 1675 (1970).
But see Champlin, supra note 53, at 95.
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analysis of the interests in mooted employment discrimination class actions,
propose•a more appropriate resolution of the mooted class action issues.
III. DOCTRINE IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
The current Supreme Court approach to the class action mootness issues
is the result of a series of case-by-case determinations that lack the unifying
force of a consistent and well-advised rationale. It is clear, however, that the
mooted class action presents two basic issues: (1) whether the case, despite the
mootness of the named plaintiff's personal claim, continues to satisfy the per-
sonal stake requirement, and (2) whether the case continues to meet the re-
quirements of Rule 23. This section will propose, in the context of mooted
employment discrimination class actions,' 24
 that the personal stake require-
ment be cased so that most, if not all, mooted class actions will continue to
satisfy that requirement. 225
 The section will also propose that the named plain-
tiff's continued compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 be reviewed when
he loses his personal claim. If, as is probably the case, he can no longer satisfy
the Rule's requirements, the court should hold the case on its docket until a
class member comes forward who can meet the requirements. If no class
member has come forward after a reasonable period of time, the case should be
dismissed. Such an analysis would result in a consistent and predictable
mooted class action doctrine; it would permit such actions to continue where
the interests of the named plaintiff, class members, defendant, and public are
served, while maintaining the integrity of the Rule 23 requirements.
A. Personal Stake in the Mooted Action
Personal stake is surely one of the most maligned judicial doctrines of our
time. The "gossamer distinctions" 126 required by the "labyrinth of analytical-
ly questionable decisions"'" in the area have prompted more than one com-
mentator to suggest that "like an old soldier, ... the doctrine [should] fade
away.' "28
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine is
'" It should he noted that, although this article utilizes the employment discrimination
class action as a paradigm for discussion, the conclusions reached should in most instances be
directly applicable, or at least closely analogous, to class actions in other substantive areas.
'" See text at notes 119-75 infra. See also Tushnet, The "Case or Controversy" Controversy,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706-07 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet Controversy].
125
 Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1974).
' 27 Bernstine, A "Standing" Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 501, 503.
126 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL, L. REV. 663,
700 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet Standing]. See also Homburger, Private Suits in the Public
Interest in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343 (1974); Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Jaffe,
Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Con-
stitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 806 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non- Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV 1033 (1968);
Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REV. 229 (1969); Note, Mootness and
Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 867 (1965). Cf. Roberts, Fact
Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L.- REV. 390 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
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"riddled with exceptions'" 29 and that jurisprudence in the area "can be
characterized, aptly [and quite generously], as 'flexible. ",130
As noted above,' 3 ' the personal stake requirement has two aspects in the
ordinary case: (1) a constitutional limitation on the power of the federal courts
that derives from the "case or controversy" language of Article III, and (2) an
additional, self-imposed, "prudential" restraint on the exercise of judicial
power.'" In employment discrimination cases, however, Congress defined
standing as broadly as is permitted by the Constitution. 133 Consequently, the
personal stake requirement imposes only a constitutional limitation in such
lawsuits.' 34 Traditionally, this constitutional personal stake requirement has
required "some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant." 135 Resolution of the personal stake issue, then,
would turn on the plaintiff's ability to allege a "continuing or threatened injury
at the hands of the adversary. " 136 This articulation of the personal stake re- ,
quirement was thought to enhance the public interest in the separation of
powers, integrity of the decision-making process and economy of judicial
Roberts] (the Supreme Court's "manipulation of pleading principles has diverted the Court
from formulating a comprehensive and workable approach to standing").
1 " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1213 n.11 (1980).
i" Id. That which is "flexible" to the Supreme Court is "lawlessly discretionary" to
critical commentators. See Tushnet Standing, supra note 128, at 697.
131 See text at note 10 supra.
132 United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1215 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
'" "The use in 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5 of the language `a person claiming to be aggrieved'
shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution." Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). See also
Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d
466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1976).
13♦ Sec note 133 supra. The Supreme Court has held that the prudential restraint on
judicial power can be bypassed when a claim is brought pursuant to a statute which expressly or
impliedly extends standing to the limits permitted by Article III. See, e.g. , Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 702 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972).
See gene-rally Casenotc, 57 U. DE T. J. U RR. L. 671, 676 (1980).
It should be noted, however, that although the personal stake requirement has been
cloaked by the courts in constitutional outer garments, the concept has been largely a creation of
twentieth century judicial decisions. There is nothing in history requiring a rigid standing rule as
implicit in the Article III language. Berger, supra note 128, at 840. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 5 3531, at 176, 180.
135 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). See also Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
'" United States Parole Comin'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1216 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). The emphasis on injury in fact gives one an impression of simple, almost mechanical, ap-
plication to most cases. That is not the case:
Injury in fact would seem to be a simple test for standing, but several Supreme
Court opinions have introduced considerable complexity by radically restricting
the range and types of qualifying "injuries." A purely abstract injury will not suf-
fice; it must be a "concrete," "particularized" injury not shared by the public
generally.
Roberts, supra note 128, at 394.
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resources. 137
 More specifically, the personal stake requirement was intended to
ensure a "concrete and adversarial presentation." 138
 Thus, the traditional per-
sonal stake requirement — an injury to the plaintiff — was artificial to the ex-
tent it sought to further certain public policies, not by a direct consideration of
the policies, but by reliance on an extraneous factor, actual or threatened
harm. ' 39
This traditional interpretation of the personal stake requirement poses
problems for the mooted class action plaintiff. Assume, for example, that in the
hypothetical posed in Section II,'" Employee A's personal claim was mooted
after the district court had denied Employee A's motion for class certification.
Employee A can no longer point to an "actual or threatened injury" as a result
of illegal conduct by the SLW Co. Employee A was not qualified for the job, so
SLW's refusal to hire her was not illegal conduct. Thus, under traditional per-
sonal stake analysis which focuses on Employee A's interest in pursuing her
substantive claim, Employee A would not be allowed to continue the class ac-
tion.' 41
Geraghty, however, presages a weakening of traditional personal stake no-
tions. In Geraghty, the Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff in Employee A's posi-
tion to continue a lawsuit. The Court noted that the named plaintiff's residual
interest in obtaining class certification was tenuous,' 42
 but nevertheless held
that the personal stake requirement could be met if the purpose of the require-
ment was satisfied:
[T]he purpose of the "personal stake" requirement is to assure that
the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. The imperatives of
a dispute capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues in
a concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously ad-
vocating opposing positions. . . . We conclude that these elements
can exist with respect to the class certification issue notwithstanding
the fact that the named plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired. ...
[V]igorous advocacy can be assured through means other than the
traditional requirement of a "personal stake in the outcome. „I43
Thus, the Supreme Court drifted away from the traditional, but artificial, per-
sonal stake requirement which assumed that lack of actual or threatened harm
to the named plaintiff would undermine a concrete and adversarial presenta-
'” Sec notes 121-23 supra.
'" Tushnet Controversy, supra note 125, at 1706 n.35. See also United States Parole
Cornm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1208, 1212.
'" This "traditional personal stake inquiry" is the culmination of considerable judicial
writhing on the issue. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3531.
'" See text at note 84 supra,
'I. ' The Supreme Court has refused to recognize the interests of unnamed class members
in the absence of class certification, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8
(1978); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 310 n.1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148 (1975) (per
curial-11); Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 130 (1975). But see Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
'" 100 S. Ct. at 1211-12.
' 43
 Id. at 1212.
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tion of the ease.'" Rather, the Geraghty Court expanded its inquiry beyond a
narrow examination of Employee A's "actual or threatened injury" and
directly and practically determined whether the dispute satisfied the policies
underlying the personal stake requirement.
In Geraghty, then, the outlines of a new and pragmatic approach to per-
sonal stake can be discerned. This pragmatic approach recognizes, as does
Geraghty, that the personal stake requirement can be met even if the traditional
"actual or threatened injury" with respect to the named plaintiff's substantive
claim is absent. 145 Article III merely requires "vigorous advocacy" 146 and that
requirement can be satisfied even after the loss of the named plaintiff's
substantive claim. Under the pragmatic approach, the search for the required
"vigorous advocacy" would extend beyond the named plaintiff's interest in his
substantive claim to his residual interests 147 and to the interests of unnamed
class members.'" If these latter interests provided the incentive for the
necessary "vigorous advocacy,' '" 9 a denial of review would be justified only if
such a denial would further an articulated policy. 15° For example, a denial of
'" See notes 138-39 supra.
14 i This does not mean that the existence or non-existence of actual or threatened injury
is rendered irrelevant. Rather, the existence of the traditional injury in fact is the starting point of
the analysis. A plaintiff who is injured in fact is entitled to judicial review. Elementary justice dic-
tates that one who is injured by allegedly illegal action should have a remedy. DAVIS, supra note
122, at 22.02 (1970).
1 " In Geraghty, the Supreme Court held that the persona] stake requirement could be
met, even though the named plaintiff's personal claim had expired, if the purpose of the require-
ment was satisfied. 100 S. Ct. at 1212. "Vigorous advocacy" was the shorthand the Court util-
ized in Geraghty to identify that purpose. Id. Although the Court's finding of "vigorous
advocacy" in Geraghty was conclusory, vigorous advocacy appears to include both "sharply
presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating op-
posing positions." Id. Vigorous advocacy also appears to be the crux of Professor Tushnet's pro-
posed "barebones approach" to Article III. Tushnet Controversy, supra note 125, at 1706.
'" See text at notes 58-78 supra.
1 " Although the Supreme Court noted the interests of unnamed class members, the
Court's dispositions in Roper and Geraghty did not require it to consider those interests. See Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1170, 1174 & n.12. Justice Stevens in his concurrence,
however, stated that the interests of unnamed class members should be recognized as sufficient to
satisfy the personal stake requirement. 100 S. Ct. at 1175-76. But see 100 S. Ct. at 1184 n.21
(Powell, J., dissenting). See also text at notes 168-73 infra.
149 Roper and Geraghty hold that these interests do supply the required vigorous advocacy.
It should be noted that the pragmatic approach is not precluded by the constitutional basis of the
personal stake requirement. Article III does not explicitly impose an "actual or threatened in-
jury" requirement; rather, the Article III language is general and, hence, subject to varying in-
terpretations. The proposed pragmatic approach would merely expand the scope of the search for
the vigorous advocacy required by Article Ill.
' 5° The pragmatic approach to personal stake modifies the traditional approach by
utilizing a familiar legal technique — a shifting of the burden of proceeding. In the absence of an
injury in fact under the traditional approach, review is denied sinless the plaintiff comes forward
with a policy, such as "capable of repetition, yet evading review," which overcomes the other-
wise automatic denial of review. Compare Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1976), and Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1975) (review
denied), with Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 110-11 n.11 (1975) (review permitted). This approach occasionally results in standing deci-
sions which lack an articulated policy basis. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345
U.S. 153, 156 (1953). The proposed pragmatic approach places the burden of proceeding on the
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review would be justified if the absence of the traditionally required injury in
fact resulted in unavoidable separation-of-powers concerns"' or if a "better"
plaintiff were available.'"
This pragmatic approach to the personal stake issue is an encouraging im-
provement over the artificial traditional approach. The traditional approach,
as noted above, 153 focuses on the interests of Employee A in her substantive
claim. It fails to consider adequately the residual interest of Employee A and
the interests of unnamed class members.'" In addition, the determinative fac-
tor under the traditional approach is the existence or nonexistence of actual or
threatened harm to the named plaintiff. That factor, however, does not ensure
furtherance of the policies underlying the personal stake requirement.' 55 In
Geraghty, for example, the named plaintiff could not satisfy the traditional "ac-
tual or threatened harm" factor,' 56
 but the Court found that the policy
underlying the personal stake requirement — the assurance of a concrete
dispute capable of judicial resolution"' — was satisfied. If the Geraghty Court
had adhered to the traditional approach, review would have been denied on
personal stake grounds even though the policy underlying the personal stake
requirement was satisfied. Finally, the traditional approach is easily manipu-
lated.'" As a result, the courts may "hide [their] real concerns about separa-
defendant. Once the expanded search of the pragmatic approach locates an interest assuring
vigorous advocacy, the defendant must come forward with a rational policy basis to obtain an
order denying review. Consequently, by permitting review unless a policy is articulated which
militates against a consideration of the merits, the pragmatic approach ensures that an artificial
and purposeless barrier will not deny parties an opportunity to be heard.
'Si See note 121 supra. See also Tushnet Standing, supra note 128, at 700.
I" This "best plaintiff" notion may be the key to a more enlightened personal stake doc-
trine. Although a plethora of policies have been utilized to support the traditional personal stake
doctrine, see notes 121-23 supra, the overriding policy consideration is, and should be, whether
the plaintiff is a proper party to adjudicate the issues raised. See United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (standing "focuses primarily on the party seeking to get his complaint
before the federal court rather than 'on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated ...' "); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968) ("]when standing is placed in issue ... the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue „ "). See also DAv supra note 122, at 5 22.04. The pragmatic approach to per-
sonal stake would face this issue, not by looking to an artificial indicator like injury in fact, but by
a direct evaluation of the challenged plaintiff and possible alternative plaintiffs. This "best plain-
tiff' concept has been utilized by the Supreme Court in jus tertii cases. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 115-16 (1976) (plurality opinion); C. WRIGHT, A, MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: . j UR ISDICTION 3531, at 211-12. A broader use of the concept has
been advocated by a distinguished commentator. Tushnet Standing, supra note 129, at 700. A
full explication of the factors impacting on the "best plaintiff' issue is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. See text at notes 174-75 infra.
153 See text at note 139 supra.
154 See text at notes 147-48 supra.
155 DAVIS, supra note 122, at 22.04.
156 100 S. Ct. at 1211.
1 " Id. at 1212. It is interesting to note that the Court in Geraghty considered only one of
the underlying policies of the personal stake requirement.
' 58 See, e.g., Tushnet Controversy, supra note 125, at 1705; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 3.21, at 93 (1978); Tushnet Standing, supra note 128, at 663-64, 699; Wolff,
Standing to Sue: Capricious Applications of Direct Injury Standard, 20 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 663, 674-75
(1976).
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tion of powers, federalism, public law litigation, or whatever behind the cloak
of [personal stake]," 1 " and thus obscure the real issues.
The pragmatic approach meets these shortcomings. It embraces a con-
sideration of interests in addition to those of Employee A in her substantive
claim. It furthers the policies underlying the personal stake requirement by
directly considering those policies rather than relying on an extraneous and ar-
tificial factor. Finally, by requiring this direct consideration of policies, the
pragmatic approach limits the ability of courts to obscure or avoid the real
reasons underlying a decision to short-circuit a suit.
Unfortunately, the Geraghty Court carefully limited its holding to a post-
denial of certification situation. 16° Presumably, then, the named plaintiffs in
pre-certification and pre-suit mootness situations 16 ' still must meet the tradi-
tional requirements of personal stake.t 62 Thus, the horizontal inequities in-
herent in the Supreme Court's current approach to the mooted class action
continue. An expansion of the applicability of the pragmatic approach to the
pre-certification and pre-suit mootness situations would be preferable.
The application of this pragmatic approach to personal stake can be il-
lustrated by reference to the employment discrimination hypothetical of Sec-
159 Tushnet Controversy, supra note 125, at 1726.
Ls° 100 S. Ct. at 1212. Indeed, the Court so vigorously limited its holding that it may not
even apply to all post-denial of certification situations. In Geraghty, the named plaintiff was
challenging parole guidelines. Id. at 1206. He remained a prisoner until after class certification
was denied, but was released prior to the decision on appeal. Id. at 1207. When the class certifica-
tion ruling was reversed on appeal, the reversal related back to the date of the original denial — a
time at which the named plaintiff was suffering "actual or threatened harm." Id. The Court
notes, however, that "[i]f the named plaintiff [had] no personal stake in the outcome at the time
class certification [was] denied, relation back of appellate reversal of that denial still would not
prevent mootness of the action." 100 S. Ct. at 1214 n.11. The ramifications of this statement can
be illustrated by reference to the Employee A hypothetical. Assume that class certification is
denied and then the court determines Employee A was not qualified for the job she sought. If the
class certification denial is reversed on appeal, will the relation back doctrine of Geraghty save the
case from mootness? Arguably, the answer is no because Employee A, unlike the named plaintiff
in Geraghty who was still a prisoner when class certification was denied, had no personal stake in
the outcome at the time class certification was denied, or indeed at any time. Nevertheless, the
court may hold that Employee A did have a personal stake in the outcome at the time class cer-
tification was denied because, at that stage of the litigation, mere allegations suffice to establish
Employee A's personal stake. If that is the result, however, the determination depends wholly on
the timing of the original class certification denial. If the lower court says "Employee A is not
qualified and, by the way, the class is denied," the case will be forever moot. If the court instead
says "the class is denied and, moreover, Employee A is not qualified," the class claims can later
be revived. Such a distinction would aggravate the horizontal inequities noted above. See text at
notes 83-88 supra.
161
 In post-certification mootness situations, the Supreme Court has sanctioned an ap-
proach somewhere in between the traditional and pragmatic approaches described above. On the
one hand, the approach to post-certification mootness goes beyond the traditional approach by
looking beyond the interest of the named plaintiff to the interests of unnamed class members to
find the required personal stake. On the other hand, the approach continues to require the tradi-
tional "actual or threatened injury."
' 62 As noted before, see text at notes 81-82 supra, in a pre-certification mootness situa-
tion, an exception is made to the traditional requirements if the claim of the named plaintiff is so
inherently transitory that the trial court does not even have time to rule on class certification
before the claim is mooted.
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tion II.' 63
 Assume that Employee A's substantive claim was mooted after a
right-to-sue letter had been issued, but before the complaint was filed.'"
Employee A nevertheless filed a complaint against the SLW Co. seeking (1) to
obtain an injunction against certain allegedly illegal employment practices,
and (2) to represent a class of employees against whom the SLW Co. had
allegedly discriminated. Here it appears that Employee A has not suffered an
injury sufficient to meet the traditional personal stake requirement, because
her interest in her substantive claim has dissipated. 165
 Consequently, under the
traditional approach, Employee A's suit would be dismissed. The pragmatic
approach, however, sanctions an expanded search for the vigorous advocacy
required by Article III. This expanded search involves a consideration of both
the residual interests of Employee A and the interests of unnamed class
members. Roper and Geraghty hold that in post-denial of certification situations,
the mooted named plaintiff's residual interests in allocating litigation expenses
and in pursuing class claims are sufficient to overcome the personal stake
limitation.'" Employee A can forward these same residual interests to satisfy
the personal stake requirements in the pre-suit mootness situation postu-
lated."'
In addition to Employee A's residual interests, Employee A could forward
the interests of unnamed class members to meet the Article III requirements.
The Supreme Court has indicated that after certification of the class, the per-
sonal stake requirement can be satisfied by the existence of a controversy be-
tween the named defendant and unnamed class members.'" Justice Stevens
has argued that the interests of the unnamed class members could fulfill the
personal stake requirement even before the class has been certified.'" Justice
Stevens thus raises the issue of the point at which the class qua class is entitled to
judicial recognition.' 7° His resolution of that issue — that is, that even before
class certification the class is entitled to a limited judicial recognition — finds
support in normal pleading rules. Generally, a party need not prove allegations
'" See text at note 84 supra.
164 See note 18 supra.
' 65 See text at note 141 supra. This article has noted various interests Employee A has in
the continuation of her suit: her interest as a citizen in the elimination of illegal employment
discrimination, her interest as an employee in a discrimination-free work environment, and her
interest in pursuing class claims. These interests have not been construed as sufficient to meet the
traditional personal stake requirement in a pre-suit mootness situation, See cases cited in note 79
supra.
' 66
 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1173-75; United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1211.
167 See text at notes 83-89 supra.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 402.
I69
 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (Stevens,., concurring).
' 7° Several federal courts have held that a valid class should be presumed to exist be-
tween the time a class action is filed and the trial court's decision on certification. See, e.g., Pear-
son v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Ross
v. Warner, 80 F.R.D. 88, 90 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Kane, Standing, Moolness, and Federal
Rule 23 — Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 83, 97-98 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as
Kane]; Bledsoe, Moolness and Standing in Class Actions, I FLA, ST. U.L. REV. 430, 446-51 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bledsoe'.
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in a complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss. It is sufficient that the allega-
tions themselves make out a cause of action. For example, if a plaintiff alleges
in a complaint that he has been discharged from his employment, he should be
able to withstand a motion to dismiss and present evidence on whether or not
he was actually discharged. The allegations themselves are sufficient to fulfill
the personal stake requirement at least until countervailing evidence is
presented. Similarly, allegations in the complaint that a class has been injured
could be construed as sufficient to fulfill the personal stake requirement, thus
allowing the named plaintiff to present evidence on whether there actually is a
viable class, whether it has been injured, and whether the named plaintiff is a
proper class representative."' Based on the interests of unnamed class
members, 172
 then, Employee A may have standing to pursue her claim that she
is entitled to represent a class. 13
A finding of "vigorous advocacy" based on Employee A's residual in-
terests or the interests of unnamed class members, however, does not end the
personal stake inquiry. The SLW Co. may still argue that there is a policy-
based justification for a denial of review. For example, the SLW Co. may con-
tend that Employee A is not the "best plaintiff" to pursue the lawsuit. Accord-
171 See, e.g., Washington v, Wyman, 56 F.R.D. 266, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), and cases
cited in note 170 supra. See also Summers, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part
Two — Class Actions, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1320, 1328 n.63 (1976); Bledsoe, supra note 170, at 445-51;
313 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.50, at 23-423-25; Kane, supra note 170, at 104.
1 " According Employee A standing on the basis of the interests of unnamed class
members is not without significant problems. First, it arguably opens the door to "public in-
terest" litigation. If class allegations themselves create a class interest capable of satisfying the
personal stake requirements, anyone could file a complaint with class allegations and meet the
personal stake requirement by relying on the interests of unnamed class members. This concern
is minimal, however, because the horrors of public interest litigation are largely imagined, see
Tushnet Controversy, supra note 125, at 1708-21, and because the door opened by this analysis
should be at least partially closed by a sensitive enforcement of Rule 23. See note 173 infra. The
second problem with basing Employee A's standing on the interests of unnamed class members,
as noted by Justice Powell, Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1184 n.21 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting), is that it may have ramifications that extend beyond Article III. If the
class is entitled to judicial recognition at the pleading stage, does Employee A assume fiduciary
responsibilities to the class at that time? If so, do those fiduciary responsibilities extend to an
obligation to continue litigation, and to absorb the attendant expenses, even though Employee
A's personal claim is meritless? See note 78 supra. Will this adversely affect Employee A's will-
ingness to pursue class claims? Once again, however, a sensitive application of the Rule 23 re-
quirements should alleviate the problem. If, as is probably the case, Employee A cannot satisfy
the Rule 23 requirements, her fiduciary responsibilities should be de rninimis and the practical ef-
fect of the personal stake holding will be to allow the case to remain on the docket until a
representative surfaces who can assume such responsibilities. See note 173 infra. Moreover, the
benefits to Employee A of recognizing such class interests, such as the increased probability that
Employee A will be able to allocate litigation expenses to the entire class, may outweigh the al-
leged burden of undefined fiduciary responsibilities. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100
S. Ct. at 1174 n.12. Finally, as Justice Stevens notes, the possibility that fiduciary responsibilities
may be imposed is but one of many risks that Employee A must weigh when she decides to pur-
sue the litigation. Id. at 1176-77 n.4.
' 73
 As noted below, see text at notes 183-84 infra, it is unlikely that Employee A would be
able to represent the class. She is not a member of the class and her claims are not typical of the
claims of the class. Thus, the practical result of this recognition of the interests of the unnamed
class members is that the court can retain the case on its docket until an appropriate class
representative surfaces.
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ing to SLW Co., employees B, C, and D who have actually been subjected to
the alleged discrimination would have more immediate access to and
knowledge of the relevant evidence. Employee A could counter by arguing that
Employees B, C, and D are not likely to assert their rights because of threat-
ened retaliation by the SLW Co. and, hence, that Employee A is the "best
available proponent" of the asserted rights. " 4 Employee A could also assert that
Employees B, C, and D are not "better" plaintiffs because the case will de-
pend on statistical evidence of discrimination and, thus, Employees B, C, and
D have no greater access to or knowledge of the relevant evidence than
Employee A. Although resolution of this issue and similar issues,' 75
 will define
the ultimate scope of the personal stake limitation, resolution of such issues is
beyond the scope of this article. The pertinent point is that the analytical
framework provided by the pragmatic approach to personal stake forces the
courts to consider such policy issues directly. The courts cannot, as they could
under the traditional approach, avoid the policy issues by relying on the ar-
tificial factor of actual or threatened harm.
In summary, the pragmatic approach to personal stake would require
nothing more startling than an expanded search for the vigorous advocacy re-
quired by Article III and a policy-based justification when review is denied.
The goals of the pragmatic approach are to force a retreat from the artificiality
of the traditional approach and to bring the personal stake limitation back in
touch with its policy underpinnings. Satisfaction of the personal stake limita-
tion, however, is not determinative of whether the employment discrimination
class action should be allowed to continue after mootness of the named plain-
tiff's personal cause of action. The named plaintiff must also overcome the
Rule 23 limitation.
B. Rule 23 in the Mooted Class Action
At English common law, litigation was perceived as a two-party affair —
one plaintiff against one defendant. Only in rare instances did the English com-
mon law courts deviate from this principle. 16
 Eventually the class action
emerged as a procedural device to protect the defendant from inconsistent
obligations, to guard the interests of absentees, to provide a convenient and
economical method of disposing of similar lawsuits, and to facilitate the
spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.'"
Rule 23 subsequently was developed to encourage use of the device and to
regulate potential abuses. 18
 Under Rule 23, class actions can be maintained
only if certain requirements are met. "9
 In class actions where the named plain-
'" See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 116 (1976) (plurality opinion); Tushnet Stand-
ing, supra note 128, at 700. See also note 152 supra.
17' The SLW Co. could forward other policy-based justifications for denying review.
For example, it could argue that review will result in a violation of separation of powers prin-
ciples, see note 121 supra, or in an overburdening of the courts, see note 123 supra.
' 76 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1751.
'" United Stales Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1211,
17 ' C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL SS
1752-1753.
19 See Rule 23(a)-(b). These requirements include numerosity, Rule 23(a)(1); corn-
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tiff's personal claim has been lost, however, the Supreme Court has failed to
require adherence to all of the requirements of Rule 23. As a result, the Court
has created problems that could easily have been avoided if Rule 23 had been
followed.
The Supreme Court has eased the Rule 23 requirements in at least three
circumstances. First, in post-certification mootness cases like Sosna and Franks,
the Supreme Court has allowed the named plaintiff to continue representing
the class.'" Second, in post-denial of certification cases like Roper and Geraghty,
the Court has allowed the named plaintiff to represent the class for the purpose
of appealing the denial of class certification:" Finally, in pre-certification
mootness cases, the Supreme Court has allowed the named plaintiff to repre-
sent the class if the claims asserted are inherently transitory: 82 The named
plaintiffs could not meet the Rule 23 requirement that the representative party
be a member of the class which he seeks to represent in any of the situations
above: 83
 In addition, none of the named plaintiffs above could satisfy the Rule
23 dictate that the claims or defenses of the representative party be typical of
the claims or defenses of the class.'" Since the named plaintiff's claim is moot
in each of the above situations, his claim is not merely atypical, it is nonexist-
ent.
Many problems are created by this easing of the Rule 23 requirements.
For instance, a class representative with a mooted personal claim creates settle-
ment problems and possible conflicts between the named plaintiff and un-
monality, Rule 23(a)(2); typicality, Rule 23(a)(3); and adequate representation, Rule 23(a)(4).
In addition, Rule 23 requires that the putative class action fall into one of the three Rule 23(b)
categories. See note 1 supra. Rule 23 does not ease its requirements if the named plaintiff"s per-
sonal claim expires during the pendency of the lawsuit. Rather, Rule 23's requirements must be
met if the action is to be "maintained." Thus, it has been suggested that the courts should at any
relevant time, reevaluate the named plaintiff's representative status in light of events which occur
during the pendency of the action. See Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions
Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE I.,. J. 573, 602 n.122; Belcher v. Bassett
Furniture Indus., Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 403.
180 See Zablocki v. Ruffian, 434 U.S. 374, 382 n.9 (1978); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). In Sosna, the Court required only
that the named plaintiff fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 419 U.S. at 403.
The Court did riot require compliance with the other Rule 23 requirements noted above. See
note 179 supra.
See Deposit Guar, Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980); United States Parole
Cornm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980). These cases indicate that the Court's easing of
Ruic 23 may have far-reaching implications. Presumably, if the named plaintiffs in Roper and
Geraghty are successful in overturning the denials of class certification, they will be in the same
position as the named plaintiffs in Sosna and Franks. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
100 S. Ct. 1212, 1214. That is, they may be able to continue representation of the class.
Moreover, to the extent that the rationale of Roper and Geraghty can be extended to pre-
certification and pre-suit mootness, see text at notes 77-89 supra, they may have an even greater
bootstrapping effect.
'" Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
110-11 n.11. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975).
143 See East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977);
Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974); 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 23.01121; C. WRIC;HT & A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
1761
18*
	 R. Ctv. P. 23(a)(3).
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named class members. ' a5 Another problem is that the defendant's discovery ef-
forts may be hampered.'" Furthermore, the unnamed class members may not
receive representation sufficient to satisfy due process and may not be bound
by an adverse judgment."' More significantly, however, the easing leads to
conceptual difficulties with the class action device. Assume, for example, a
post-denial of certification situation. In Geraghty, the Supreme Court holds that
the named plaintiff retains a sufficient interest in the suit to appeal the denial of
class certification.'" But what is the court of appeals to do on appeal?
Presumably, the court of appeals is to determine whether the district court
should have certified a class with the named plaintiff as its representative at the
time it denied class certification, 189 even though it is clear that the named plaintiff
cannot now meet the requirements of Rule 23. 190 The court of appeals can
determine either that the district court was correct in denying class certification
or that it erred in doing so. If the court of appeals determines that the district
court was correct, the case can be dismissed as moot. 19 ' If the court of appeals
determines that the district court's class certification decision was erroneous, it
must remand to the district court.' 92 The district court, however, is not re-
quired to certify a class. Rather, it must determine whether the named plaintiff
is still a proper class representative.'" If the named plaintiff remains an ade-
'" Settlement is complicated because the class representative has no personal interest in
a settlement offer. The class representative's opinion on the adequacy of a settlement offer is
about as valuable — or worthless — as that of any "reasonable person" off the street. Moreover,
to the extent the class representative's residual interest in the suit is in allocating litigation ex-
penses to the class, see Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. 1166 (1980), settlement of-
fers may expose conflicts between the class representative and unnamed class members. For ex-
ample, assume that the defendant in an employment discrimination suit agreed as part of a settle-
ment offer to pay all of the plaintiff's reasonable litigation costs (including those attributable sole-
ly to pursuit of the class representative's doomed personal claim, see note 99 supra), but only
agreed to assume a portion of the claimed liability to the class. Obviously, the class representative
has an interest in accepting the settlement which may not be shared by the unnamed class
members,
'" Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, greater discovery flexibility is available
against parties as opposed to non-parties. For example, interrogatories can be addressed only to
parties to the litigation, FED. R. Clv. P. 33(a); requests for the production of documents and for
entry upon land under Rule 34 may be enforced only against parties, FED. R. CP. , , P. 34(a); ex-
amination of the physical or mental condition of a person under Rule 35 is available only with
respect to parties and persons in the custody or under legal control of a party, FED, R. CIV. P.
35(a); and requests for admission under Rule 36 can be made only against parties, FED. R. Cry.,
P. 36(a). See also Rule 37(d); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 44 2171, 2208, 2233, 2291.
187 See note 111 supra.
'" United States Parole Comrn'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 1214.
1 " United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1214. See also Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1174-75.
190 At the time of appeal, the named plaintiff's personal claim has expired. Thus, he is
not a member of the class he seeks to represent nor are his claims or defenses typical of those of
the class. See notes 183-84 supra.
19 ' United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1212 ("If, on appeal [of the
class certification ruling], it is determined that class certification properly was denied, the claim
on the merits must be dismissed as moot.").
197 Id, at 1214.
'" Id. ("[U]pon remand, the District Court can determine whether [the named plain-
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quate class representative, a class can be certified and the court can proceed to
a consideration of the merits.'" If the named plaintiff is no longer an adequate
class representative, class certification must be deniedm and the case must be
dismissed' 96 or held on the docket until a proper class representative comes for-
ward. 197
The Supreme Court's approach has the "class action" cart ahead of the
"class representative" horse. A class action can only be certified and main-
tained under Rule 23 if there is a proper class representative. 199 The Court re-
quires the court of appeals to go through the rather mystical charade of deter-
mining what the lower court should have determined previously, while ignor-'
ing the fact that the named plaintiff is not now a proper class representative.
The Supreme Court's approach, therefore, sanctions an appellate determina-
tion of whether the class is in some sense "proper'" 99 before a determination is
made as to whether the class representative is adequate. The approach results
in a bifurcation of the issues which is inefficient for the courts and which will
create undue delay for class action litigants.
In light of these problems, why has the Supreme Court sanctioned an eas-
ing of the Rule 23 requirements in post-certification and post-denial of cer-
tification cases? One reason forwarded is expediency; if the named plaintiff is
allowed to remain as the class representative, the case can continue ex-
peditiously and, arguably, judicial economy will be enhanced. 20° A second
reason is that in the class of cases in which claims are inherently transitory, the
easing may be necessary to ensure that the issues can be judicially reviewed. 20 '
tiff] may continue to press the class claims or whether another representative would be ap-
propriate.' ')
194 Id. at 1212 ("If the appeal results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a
class subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim then may be adjudicated pur-
suant to the holding in Sosna,").
1 " Id. at 1214 (On remand, the district court can deny class certification if the named
plaintiff is no longer an adequate class representative.). This denial of class certification can then
be appealed to the court of appeals. Id.
196 Id. (The controversy on the merits will be moot if the district court, on remand,
denies class certification and that decision is affirmed on appeal.).
19' See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1171 n.5; Kremens v. Bartley,
431 U.S. 119, 135 (1977).
'" See notes 2 & 179 supra, See also New Life, supra note 76, at 746.
' 99 This determination is mystical, too. Rule 23 contemplates a class being certified only
if there is a proper class representative. The Supreme Court, however, envisions some type of ap-
pellate determination on the maintainability of the class while reserving the issue of who is to
represent the class. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 100 S. Ct. at 1212, 1214. Never-
theless, a more limited preliminary determination on the viability of the class by the district court
is appropriate. When the named plaintiff loses his personal claim, the district court should ex-
amine the proposed class to determine whether it could be certified if a proper representative
arose. For example, the court should determine, in a cursory fashion, whether the numerosity
and commonality requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) and (2) can be met. If these requirements cannot
be met, the case . should be dismissed. Little is served by holding a mooted class action on the
docket if no named plaintiff could maintain the action.
2°° Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 757 n.9 (1976).
20' See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 110-11 n.11 (1975).
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Unfortunately, the former of these reasons is not sufficient to outweigh the
disadvantages engendered by the easing of Rule 23. 2 °2
A more appropriate response to the class action mootness problem would
be to require a class representative with a live claim to be present at all times,
that is, to require an adherence to the requirements of Rule 23. 203
 If the named
plaintiff's claim expires, the class action cannot be maintained because Rule 23
cannot be met. Nevertheless, the district court can order the case to remain on
its docket204 so that a new representative plaintiff who can meet the re-
quirements of Rule 23 can surface. 205 To avoid solicitation problems, the court
202 Expediency does not justify an easing of Rule 23 for two reasons. First, in many
cases the easing of Rule 23 will hinder rather than further, judicial economy. Assume that a
mooted named plaintiff is allowed to continue a class suit and that he eventually loses. At that
point, unnamed class members are either going to be allowed to pursue anew their claims or they
are going to be barred from doing so. If they are allowed to pursue their claims because the
mooted named plaintiff was an inadequate class representative, the judicial economy reason for
allowing the named plaintiff's class suit to continue is undercut. If unnamed class members are
barred from pursuing their claims, they have been denied the type of representation that Rule 23,
and possibly due process, requires. Second, expediency does not justify an easing of Rule 23
because it provides no guidance as to which class suits should be allowed to continue with mooted
named plaintiffs and which should not. As the hypothetical above illustrates, whether the con-
tinuance of a class suit will further judicial economy or not may depend on whether the named
plaintiff prevails on his class allegations. That is not a determination the courts are capable of
making at the time the named plaintiff's personal claim is mooted.
The second reason forwarded by the Court to justify an easing of Rule 23 is both
necessary and narrowly applicable. It is necessary to ensure the availability of judicial review. It
is applicable only to a relatively narrow class of cases that can be readily identified.
could be argued that, as with personal stake, there should be a pragmatic approach
to class representation. Under this approach, the courts would recognize that the named plaintiff
has little to do with adequate representation, and that the attorney for the class ensures or under-
mines adequate representation. Hence, according to this approach, it is the attorney, and not the
named plaintiff, who should he scrutinized to ensure adequate representation. See Kane, supra
note 170, at 113-14; Degnan, Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60 CAL. L. REV.
705, 715-16 (1972). The argument certainly has some force, but not under Rule 23. Rule 23 re-
quires that the named plaintiff be a member of the class he seeks to represent, see, e. g. , East Texas
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S 395, 403 (1977); Schlesinger v. Reservists to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974), that the claims or defenses of the named plaintiff be
typical of those of the class, FED. R. C iv. P. 23(a)(3), and that the "representative parties" fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class. FED. R. Cry. P. 23(a)(4). The advocates of a
pragmatic approach to class representation must, as a first step, revise the requirements of Rule
23. Moreover, even if Rule 23 did not preclude such an approach, its advocates have not ex-
plained how to overcome the judicial reluctance to rule on the sensitive question of the ability of a
member of the bar. See Comment, The Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68
Nw. U.L. REV. 1133, 1136-37 (1974).
204 See note 199 supra.
2°' See Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15-16 (4th Cir. 1972); Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes,
471 F. Supp. 670, 676-77 (D. Md. 1979); Proffitt v. Consolidation Coal Co., 21 FEP Cas. 382,
385 (S.D. W. Va. 1979); Taylor v. Springmeier Shipping Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1233,
1234 (W. D. Tenn. 1971); Bledsoe, supra note 170, at 461. These cases do not, however, provide
guidance as to the length of time the court should retain the case on its docket. As noted by one
commentator, "rainy time [limitation] may appear arbitrary if a new plaintiff comes forward
after it has expired." New Life, supra note 76, at 761 (emphasis in original). It is probably im-
possible to fix any single time limitation as appropriate for all class actions, or even for employ-
ment discrimination class actions. But see New Life, supra note 76, at 762 (suggests a 180-day
guideline for employment discrimination class actions). Rather, the time limitation will depend
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can also order or permit notice to putative class members to inform them of the
pendency of the action. 206 If an adequate representative plaintiff does not come
forward, the case can be dismissed.'" This procedure avoids a mystical inquiry
by the court of appeals into whether a class could be maintained if there was a
proper class representative. The procedure proposed here also ensures both
that unnamed class members will not be unduly prejudiced by a dismissal
without a prior opportunity to intervene and that only lawsuits which meet the
prudent requirements of Rule 23 208 can be maintained. 209
The suggested procedure is generally intended for post-certification, as
well as pre-certification, mootness. It does not, however, require strict com-
pliance with Rule 23 in every mootness situation. Limited, policy-based excep-
tions to the requirements of Rule 23 are both permissible and desirable. For ex-
ample, assume that the named plaintiff's personal claim has become moot and
that the nature of the claims made on behalf of the class are such that the per-
sonal claim of each class member is short-lived. 210 If the district court required
on a number of factors, such as the size of the putative class, the type of notice to the class, the
nature of the alleged discrimination, and the age of the discrimination claims.
2 °6 See FEU. R. Cfv. P. 23(d); Pre-Certification Loss, supra note 80, at 170-72. See also Booth
v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466, 475-76 (D, Md. 1975); Rothman v. Gould, 52
F.R.D. 494, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In regulating such communications, the courts must be
alert to potential abuse of the class action process, see Note, Goodman v. Schlesinger and the
Headless Class Action, 60 B.U. L. REV. 348, 360-61 (1980); Federal judicial Center, Manual for
Complex Litigation, pt. I, § 1.14, at 46 (1978), while taking care to avoid infringement of the
named plaintiff's rights of communication with the putative class under Rule 23 and the first
amendment. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 23 EPD 1 31,029, at 16,325-30 (5th Cir. 1980); Zarate
v. A. Norton Younglove, 23 EPD 1 30,958 at 15,935-37 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See generally Com-
ment, Restrictions on Communication by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360 (1980).
207 This procedure avoids injustice to unnamed class members. While dismissal may
prejudice the interests of unnamed class members, see notes 108-11 supra, a dismissal after notice
and an opportunity to intervene is not as objectionable as automatic dismissal upon mootness of
the named plaintiff's claim. If the unnamed class members perceive their interests as too in-
significant to justify intervention to save the lawsuit from dismissal, there is no injustice in allow-
ing the lawsuit to die.
2" See New Life, supra note 76, at 761; Note, Class Actions: Certification and Notice Re-
quirements, 68 GEO. L.J. 1009, 1025 (1980).
209 An additional issue is interjected in employment discrimination lawsuits. There are
procedural prerequisites to the filing of an employment discrimination lawsuit. See note 106
supra. Nevertheless, a named plaintiff who has fulfilled the procedural prerequisites can obtain
relief for unnamed class members who have not. See note 107 supra. If, however, the named
plaintiff's personal claim becomes moot prior to the culmination of the lawsuit, should a new
representative plaintiff be allowed to continue the lawsuit even though he has not satisfied Title
VII's procedural prerequisites? An examination of the purposes of the procedural prerequisites
leads to the conclusion that the lawsuits, in most instances, should be allowed to continue. The
purposes of the procedural prerequisites are (1) to provide notice to the charged party; (2) to
bring to bear the voluntary compliance and conciliation procedures of the EEOC; (3) to permit
the EEOC to examine the adequacy of the charge; and (4) to determine the scope of the alleged
violation, and, hence, to narrow the issues for adjudication. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969). Assuming a charge which makes appropriate class allegations,
these purposes are fulfilled whether the lawsuit is pursued by the person who filed the charge or
by an unnamed class member,
21 ° In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), for example, the named plaintiffs chal-
lenged the legality of their pretrial detention. Id. at 106-07. Thus, the personal claim of each class
member, including the named plaintiffs, was inherently short-lived. Id. at 110-11 n.11.
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strict compliance with Rule 23 and followed the suggested procedure, the
named plaintiff could not represent the class 2 " and the court would hold the
case on its docket until a new representative came forward. The new represen-
tative's personal claim, however, would also be short-lived. Consequently, the
case would be delayed repeatedly while new class representatives were cer-
tified. In this situation, a limited, policy-based exception to the Rule 23 re-
quirements should be made. 212 Even though the original named plaintiff can
no longer meet the requirements of Rule 23, an exception is justified by in-
terests in judicial economy that are both readily identifiable and applicable to
only a narrow class of cases."'
In summary, the Supreme Court has sanctioned an easing of Rule 23's re-
quirements in a number of circumstances. This creates many problems, in-
cluding an increased risk that unnamed class members will be inadequately
represented. In most cases, district courts should hold class actions on their
dockets when the personal claim of a named plaintiff becomes moot. This will
permit the intervention of parties who can meet the requirements of Rule 23.
Nevertheless, limited policy-based exceptions to.strict compliance with Rule 23
are appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Although counseling a shift in focus, this article does not require a
wholesale revision of Supreme Court doctrine. Rather, the cases decided by the
Supreme Court contain the seeds of the approach presented in this article. This
article identifies a drift away from the traditional personal stake analysis and
towards a more pragmatic approach. The article urges a hastening of that drift.
The article then recommends that mooted class actions be held on the docket to
permit class representatives who can meet the requirements of Rule 23 to in-
tervene. This procedure has been utilized by the Supreme Court. 214
The mooted class action is governed by a doctrinal landscape that was
described early in this article as analogous to the landscape of Mount St.
Helens. As with the mountain, the doctrinal rumblings will probably continue,
with occasional explosions, for a quarter of a century or more before the land-
scape is stabilized. The proposals in this article are modestly forwarded in the
hope that the rumblings, and concomitant damage and uncertainty, can be
minimized.
7 " See text and notes at notes 183-84 supra.
2" The proposed Rule 23 analysis is analogous to the "capable of repetition, vet
evading review" exception to the standing-mootness doctrine. See Swisher v, Brady, 438 U.S.
204, 213 n.11 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110-11 n.11 (1975). See also Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S. Ct. at 1175 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
20 Recognition of such exceptions means that some classes will be represented by per-
sons who cannot meet the requirements of Rule 23. In applying such exceptions, then, courts
should closely scrutinize the ability of putative class representatives to fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class, FED. R. CR' P. 23(a)(4), even if the other requirements of Rule 23
cannot he met. Moreover, the exceptions themselves should, in deference to Rule 23, be limited
to relatively narrow classes of cases in which the interests protected by the exception are readily
identifiable.
2 " See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. at 135; Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 100 S.
Ct. at 1171 n.5.
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